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IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
KATHLEEN CLONTZ, I 
PETITION FOR 
Plaintiff/Respondent / WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
vs. / 
HARVEY CLONTZ, / Case No. 
Defendant/Appellant/Petitioner / Priority No. 13 
/ 
STATEMENT OF QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
QUESTION NO. 1 
The trial court's non-award of alimony to the 
defendant, and the Court of Appeals confirmation of this 
Order is a manifest injustice contrary to Sections 30-3-5 of 
the Utah Code Annotated, (1953) as amended and constitutes 
an abuse of discretion. Other Appellate decisions appear to 
be in conflict with this decision, in that the appellate 
court has upheld awards of alimony in the same circumstances 
that Petitioner is in. It is the Petitioner's position that 
the contrary, (upholding a non-award) would be an abuse of 
discretion. 
QUESTION NO. 2 
The trial court's distribution of the plaintiff's 
retirement found, that being that the Petitioner was not 
awarded any of the plaintiff's government retirement and the 
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Appellate Court affirmation of this distribution, is a 
manifest injustice and contrary to other appellate holdings 
where the Court of Appeals found that retirement funds are a 
marital asset and should be subject to division. 
CITATION OF RELEVANT CASE LAW OF OPINIONS RENDERED BY THE 
COURT OF APPEALS 
Boyle v. Boyle, 55 Utah Adv. Rep. 51, (April 15, 
1987). 
Eames v. Eames, 55, Utah Adv Rep 49, (April 9, 1987) 
Petersen v. Peterson, 58 Ut. Ad. Rep. 28, (May 18, 1987) 
Rayburn v. Rayburn, 59 Utah Adv Rep 42, (May 29, 1987). 
Talley v. Talley, 61 Ut. Ad. Rep, 31, (July 2, 1987). 
Lee v. Lee, 69 Utah Adv. Rep. 51, (November 10, 1987). 
Canning v. Canning 68 Ut. Ad. Rep. 16, (October 
16, 1987). 
Claus v. Claus 727 P.2d 184 (Utah, 1986) 
Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96 (Utah, 1986) 
JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY 
This petition for a Writ of Certiorari is being sought 
pursuant to the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, Title VI, 
JURISDICTION ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO COURT OF APPEALS, Rule 
42 and 43. 
The Court of Appeals affirmation of the trial court 
judgment was filed on October 16, 1987, and an extension for 
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Enlargement of Time, was filed and entered on November 13, 
1987, thus enlarging the time for filing of this Petition 
for Writ to December 16, 1987. 
It is believed that Rule 43 (1) , (2) , and (3) confer the 
review of the appellate court decision upon the Utah Supreme 
Court. 
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Annotated, Sections 30-3-5,(1953) as 
amended. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a complaint by plaintiff /respondent and an 
answer and counterclaim, by defendant/appellant/petitioner, 
each seeking a decree of divorce and an equitable 
distribution of property and alimony rights. Plaintiff 
alleged in her complaint, and defendant in his answer and 
counterclaim, that each treated the other cruelly, causing 
mental anguish and distress. 
The Honorable David E. Roth, on March 25, 1986, sitting 
without a jury, granted plaintiff a decree of divorce based 
upon the grounds of mental cruelty. The District Court 
entered an Order regarding the distribution of property and 
defendant's rights to an alimony award. 
This Order was appealed to the Utah Supreme Court on 
August 19, 1986. This case was then transferred to the Utah 
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Court of Appeals and the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the 
trial court's decision on October 16, 1987. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Plaintiff and Defendant were married on the 7th day of 
March, 1959, in Sunset, Davis County, Utah. There have 
been five (5) children born as issue of this marriage, but 
all children are now emancipated. (TR 106) 
Plaintiff is employed at Hill Air Force Base and her 
gross income is over Two thousand dollars ($2,000.00) per 
month. (TR 103) Plaintiff has accumulated Fifteen thousand 
eight hundred fifty-six dollars and eighty-three cents 
($15,856.83) in retirement. (TR 106) 
Defendant is medically disabled and receives Civil 
Service disability in the amount of Six Hundred Fifty-Five 
dollars and forty-eight cents ($655.48) per month and has no 
other source of income. (TR 106) 
That in 1960 a home was built by the parties upon 
property given to the defendant. Presently, the property is 
unencumbered and the appraised value of the property is 
sixty-one thousand five hundred dollars ($61,500.00). (TR 96 
to 108) The appraised value of the land itself is Sixteen 
thousand dollars ($16,000.00). (TR 117) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
It is defendant/petitioner's position that the trial 
court abused its discretion contrary to the Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 30-3-5. Defendant was not awarded 
alimony nor a portion of plaintiff's retirement fund which 
would have been equitable in view of defendant's financial 
situation and the length of the parties1 marriage. When the 
effect of the inequity is combined with the payment of the 
Court awarded equity in the sum of Twenty three thousand, 
five hundred ($23,500.00) dollars to plaintiff within six 
(6) months from the date of the Order, the effect is 
evaluated and this abuse of discretion rises to a level 
requiring a modification of the trial court's order to 
insure that a manifest injustice does not occur. 
The Utah Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's 
Order and the defendant/appellant is petitioning the Utah 
Supreme Court for a Writ of Certiorari. This Petition is 
brought pursuant to several recent opinions by the Utah 
Court of Appeals which appear to be in conflict with the 
decision issued in this case, as well as prior Supreme Court 
holding, thus invoking a review of this matter pursuant to 
Rule 43, (1),(2), and (3) of the Utah Supreme Court Rules of 
Procedure. 
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ARGUMENT 
Point I 
RECENT OPINIONS BY THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS ARE 
IN CONFLICT WITH THE DECISION RENDERED IN THE 
INSTANT CASE, AND ALSO WITH PRIOR OPINIONS 
RENDERED BY THIS COURT. 
In the case at hand, petitioner was not awarded 
any alimony. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
recognize that the petitioner receives approximately six 
hundred and fifty dollars ($650.00) per month in disability 
income. The Findings also indicate that the Plaintiff is 
employed and in the trial transcript it is indicated that 
she earns over two thousand dollars ($2,000.00) per month. 
There was also testimony regarding the 
defendant/petitioner's ill health, his lack of a job, and 
that his expenses were over one thousand dollars ($1,000.00) 
per month. Despite the fact that the defendant/petitioner 
had been medically disabled since 1977, the trial court 
indicated that if he needed more money "he would have to go 
out and find a job". It is evident from the record that the 
trial court realized that the defendant could not meet his 
expenses without additional income. This abuse of 
discretion arises because alimony was not granted at least 
until the defendant/petitioner could secure employment to 
help meet his financial obligations. 
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In a recent decision, this Court found no abuse of 
discretion where alimony had been provided to "cushion" the 
recipient spouse until a return to a self-sustaining status, 
Claus v. Claus, 727 P.2d 184 (1987) Also in another matter, 
the Court found that an award of only one hundred ($100.00) 
dollars per month alimony was an abuse of discretion because 
if would not afford the wife a standard of living close to 
the standard of living enjoyed by the parties during the 
marriage. This was a thirty-year marriage and the husband's 
gross income was twenty four thousand, three hundred 
fifty-six dollars and eighty/100 ($$24,356.80) per year. 
The Court found that the husband had the ability to provide 
permanent support in the amount greater than one hundred 
dollars ($100.00) per month, and secondly, this Court found 
that although a defendant does have another source of income 
besides plaintiff's salary, the fact that the divorced wife 
has some property or other means to support herself should 
not preclude an allowance of alimony if the husband has far 
superior resources. Frank v. Frank 58 P.2d 453 (Utah, 1978) . 
A recent appellate decision, Peterson v. Peterson, 58 
Utah Advance Reporter 28 (1987) , affirmed alimony awarded by 
the trial court. The parties had been married since 1963, 
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the husband a doctor and the wife a school teacher, although 
she had not worked in some time. The appellate court 
considered the wife's previous lifestyle and the fact that 
she now had to make mortgage payments and pay ordinary 
expenses such as food, clothing, and transportation, and 
lastly they considered that she had no outside income. In 
its decision, the Court of Appeals considered the wife's 
ability to provide sufficient income and that this income 
would probably be only one-fourth of her husbands. However, 
most importantly, the Court of Appeals mentioned that it 
would be unreasonable to assume that she would immediately 
be able to enter the job market and support herself in a 
style which she had been living before the divorce. 
The Peterson case is analogous to the 
defendant/petitioner's case because now he needs to go out 
into the job market and pay for all the ordinary expenses of 
every day life and the evidence in the trial record that he 
could -not do this indicates an abuse of discretion by the 
trial court when alimony was not awarded. 
Also, in Talley v. Talley 61 Utah Advance Report, 31 
(1987) , the appellate court again upheld an award of 
alimony. The Talley1s were married for approximately 15 
years. At the time of the divorce, the plaintiff-wife net 
over nine hundred and fifty-three dollars ($953.00) per 
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month, while the defendant-husband net over two thousand 
dollars ($2,000.00) per month. The appellate court awarded 
alimony of two hundred and fifty dollars ($250.00) per month 
for two years and one hundred and fifty dollars ($150.00) 
per month for three years to the plaintiff-wife. The Court 
of Appeals indicated that they had considered the required 
factors outlined in Eames v. Eames 55, Utah Advance Report 
49, (1957) and found that there was not an abuse of 
discretion. But again, in the defendant's case, the 
defendant was married for 27 years as opposed to the Talley 
15 year marriage; that a despairity in the incomes are 
present because the husband in Talley makes approximately 
the same amount of money per month as the 
defendant/petitioner's wife and defendant/petitioner is 
making less than the wife in Talley. Interestingly however, 
the appellate court affirmed the trial court's Order in 
Talley, but not in the defendant/petitioner's case. 
The Court of Appeals mentions the Eames in several 
different opinions. The Court of Appeals mentions the 
factors to consider in awards of alimony are: 
"... 1. The financial condition and needs 
of the spouse claiming support. 
2. The ability of that spouse to provide 
sufficient income for him or her self, and 
3. The ability of the responding spouse 
to provide the support..." 
- 9 . 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the award of alimony in 
Eames, The facts of this case are that the parties were 
married for 30 years and had three grown children. The 
plaintiff-wife grossed approximately ten thousand dollars 
($10,000.00) per year and the defendant-husband's gross 
income was approximately thirty four thousand dollars 
($34,000.00) per year. Plaintiff was to receive three 
hundred dollars ($300.00) of alimony per month until she was 
65 years of age. Because the above factors were set forth 
in the Findings of Fact, the Court of Appeals found no 
abuse of discretion. However, it is interesting to note, in 
Judge Orme's decision (which was dissenting in part but 
affirming as to alimony) points out that the defendant's 
major gripe in Eames is that he did not think any alimony 
should be awarded because his former wife was able-bodied 
and gainfully employed and the Judge further indicates that 
he found that the alimony awarded by the trial court was on 
the low-ebb of what was appropriate under the doctrine 
reiterated Paffel v. Paffel 48 Utah Advance Report 12 (1986) 
in view of the parties ages and education as well as the 
length of their marriage and substantial despairity in 
incomes. Again, this is the defendant/petitioner's case 
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exactly on point. A long marriage and a substantial 
dispairity in incomes. Still, the Court of Appeals upheld 
the trial court's judgment. 
It would not be fair to omit Boyle v. Boyle 55 Utah 
Advance Reporter 51 (1987) , a case wherein the appellate 
court affirmed a decision of a non award of alimony to a 
plaintiff-wife. However, it is easy to see the difference 
in Boyle and the defendant/petitioner's matter. This was a 
7 year marriage with no children. The trial court refused 
the plaintiff-wife's request to include a finding that she 
was unable to work, but did find that "the marriage was not 
a long term marriage, and that each party was restored to 
the condition each was in at the time of the marriage, and 
therefore no alimony should be awarded." But, the Court of 
Appeals did recognize that the purpose of the alimony is to 
equalize the standard of living for both spouses, and to 
maintain them at their present standard as much as possible. 
In Boyle the appellate court found that the trial court 
properly considered the length of the marriage, and the 
recipient spouse's employability but most importantly, the 
appellate court found that the plaintiff-wife had previously 
received several months of temporary alimony to give her an 
opportunity to rehabilitate. In the defendant/petitioner's 
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case, he did not receive any type of alimony to rehabilitate 
himself or even to help him along until he did find the 
employment which he needs to make ends meet as the trial 
court well realized. 
Also, on the other side of the coin, in Lee v. Lee 69 
Utah Advance Reporters 51 (1987) the wife appealed because 
she was awarded only one dollar ($1,00) of alimony per year. 
The parties were married for 9 years. 
The Court of Appeals again cited the three factors in 
Eames and stated that after careful review of the records 
there was no explanation for the one dollar ($1.00) per year 
award. The Court of Appeals stated that the wife, at that 
time was unemployed, and despite looking for work she must 
incur the expense of moving a mobile home that she was 
awarded in the divorce and in addition to ordinary living 
expenses. The husband in Lee earned approximately eighteen 
hundred dollars ($1,800.00) per month and the trial court 
record indicates that his income had been declining.. The 
appellate court remanded this case to the trial court to fix 
alimony in light of the three factors articulated in Eames. 
It is evident that in defendant/petitioner's case, that 
the appellate court did not consider the factor one (1) of 
Eames; the financial condition and the needs of the spouse 
claiming support. In this case, the facts show that the 
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husband, defendant/petitoner, although possibly could work, 
had not found work at that time and the trial court did not 
award him any alimony to keep him until he was able to find 
employment. 
Again, in Canning v. Canning 68 Utah Advance Report 16, 
(1987) , the appellate court found that a non-award of 
alimony was clear abuse of discretion because the record did 
not reveal that the trial court considered or made any 
findings of the wife's current or future ability to work. 
The Court of Appeals indicated that the trial record 
contemplated that the plaintiff would obtain work and earn 
income sufficient to support herself, but pointed out that 
there were specific findings and she is left without a 
remedy if she does not find work. This case is identical to 
the defendant/petitioner's case. What becomes of him if he 
is unable to secure employment? 
Point II 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DISTRIBUTION OF THE PLAINTIFF'S 
RETIREMENT MANIFESTS INJUSTICE CONTRARY TO SECTION 
30-35-5 OF THE UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (1953) AND 
CONSISTS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION. THE COURT OF 
APPEALS AFFIRMATION OF THIS DISTRIBUTION IS 
CONTRARY TO OTHER APPELLATE HOLDINGS WHERE THE 
COURT OF APPEALS FOUND THAT RETIREMENT FUNDS ARE 
MARITAL ASSETS AND SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO DIVISION 
In this divorce action, the trial court did not 
consider plaintiff's retirement fund as a marital asset to 
be divided between the parties. This is in direct conflict 
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with this Courts, in Dogu v. Dogu, 62 P. 2d 1308 (Utah, 
1982), the Court cited Englert v. Englert, 576 Pacific 2nd 
1279, Utah (1978), and held that the trial courts duty to 
make an equitable division of property in a divorce action: 
".•.encompasses all of the assets of every nature 
possessed by the parties, whenever obtained and 
from whatever source derived; and that this 
includes any such pension fund or insurance." 
The trial court should have awarded a portion of 
plaintiff's retirement to the defendant as a marital asset, 
although plaintiff is not yet retired and her actual 
enjoyment of this benefit is purely prospective. 
The trial court found that the value of plaintifffs 
retirement is fifteen thousand eight hundred fifty-six 
dollars and eighty-three cents ($15,856.83). It is the 
defendant/petitioner's contention that he should be entitled 
to one-half of this amount and that the equitable thing to 
do would have been to award the defendant/petitioner his 
share of plaintiff's retirement benefits and off-set this 
amount against plaintiff's share of the trial court's 
determined equity of the marital home. In several appellate 
court decisions, particularly in Marchant v. Marchant, 6 6 
Utah Advanced Reports, 45 (1987), the Court of Appeals held 
that retirement funds were a marital asset and also quoted 
Englert. Although the emphasis in Marchant is the way the 
asset is divided, the defendant/petitioner in the instant 
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case has no problem with the division, only the lack of 
division, hence different types of division will not be 
discussed here. 
Again, in Bailey v, Bailey, 70 Utah Advance Reports 20, 
(1987) , the appellate court upheld a division of a 
retirement fund. Again, the issue in Bailey was the 
distribution and not the actual award. This case was 
remanded for the trial court to consider the proper 
division. 
In Rayburn v. Rayburn 59 Utah Advance Reports 42 (1987) 
a trial court distributed a retirement fund between the 
husband and wife. The appellate court accepted the trial 
courtfs finding of the retirement funds present value and 
found no abuse of discretion in court's awarding the 
plaintiff one-half interest in the retirement fund. 
In the trial court's summation in the 
defendant/petitioner's matter, the trial court appeared to 
find that defendant's right to receive civil service 
disability income off-sets his entitlement to plaintiff's 
retirement as a marital asset. The flaw in this reasoning 
is the fact that defendant's right to receive his disability 
income would be most appropriately considered monthly income 
as he is only entitled to this benefit as long as he is 
disabled. Further, the defendant/petitioner is not accruing 
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any retirement benefit while receiving this civil service 
disability. He has no retirement fund which is growing as 
he receives this income, as the plaintiff does. 
Lastly, the trial court found that the plaintiff's 
right to receive disability income has a value of "upwards 
around fifty thousand dollars ($50,000.00)", further, the 
trial court indicated that it would not charge defendant 
this valued amount and would off-set the parties rights to 
each other's retirements. Again, this reasoning is not 
accurate because the plaintiff is earning three (3) times 
what the defendant is earning and accruing a retirement at 
the same time. It would take defendant/petitioner six and 
one-half years to receive fifty thousand dollars 
($50,000.00) and the trial court has not taken into 
consideration what would happen if he was no longer able to 
receive the disability income. (The plaintiff would have 
earned more than One Hundred Fifty Thousand ($150,000.00) 
Dollars during this time .as well as accrued additional 
retirement benefits on top of that). 
CONCLUSION 
This Petition for Writ of Certiorari is submitted to 
the Supreme Court pursuant to Rule 42 and 43, in that the 
decision of the appealed Court of Appeals appears to be in 
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conflict with their other holdings and also holdings of this 
Court when affirming the decision of the trial court. It is 
respectfully requested that this matter be reviewed by the 
Utah Supreme Court. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this //t*L day of December, 
1987. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed four true and correct 
copies of the foregoing Writ of Certiorari to the 
plaintiff/Respondent's attorney, PETE N. VLAHOS, at Legal 
Forum Building, 2447 Kiesel Avenue, Ogden, Utah 84401 on 
this Z*1/ day of December, 1987. 
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§30-3-5. U.C.A. 
Disposition of property - Maintenance and healthcare of 
parties and children - Court to have continuing 
jurisdiction - Custody and visitation - Termination of 
alimony - Nonmeritorious petition for modification. 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may 
include in it equitable orders relating to the children, 
property, and parties. The Court shall include the following in 
every decree of divorce: 
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment 
of reasonable and necessary medical and dental expenses of 
the dependent children; and 
(b) if coverage is available at a reasonable cost, an 
order requiring the purchase and maintenance of appropriate 
health, hospital, and dental care insurance to the dependent 
children, 
(2) The. court may include,- in an order determining child 
support, an order assigning financial responsibility for all or a 
portion of child care expenses incurred on behalf of the 
dependent children, necessitated by the employment or training of 
the custodial parent. If the court determines that the 
circumstances are appropriate and that the dependent children 
would be adequately cared for, it may include an order allowing 
the non-custodial parent to provide the day care for the 
dependent children, necessitated by the employment or training of 
the custodial parent. 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make 
subsequent changes or new orders for the support and maintenance 
of the parties, the custody of the children and their support, 
maintenance, health, and dental care, or the distribution of the 
property as is reasonable and necessary. 
(4) In determing visitation rights of parents, 
grandparents, and other relatives, the court shall consider the 
welfare of the child. 
(5) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides 
otherwise, any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a 
former spouse automatically terminates upon the remarriage of 
that former spouse. However, if the remarriage is annulled and 
found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume if 
the party paying alimony is made a party to the action of 
annulment and his rights are determined. 
(6) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a 
former spouse terminates upon establishment by the party paying 
alimony that the former spouse is residing with a person of the 
opposite sex. However, if it is further established by the 
person receiving alimony that that relationship or association is 
without any sexual contact, payment of alimony shall resume. 
(7) When a petition for modification of child custody or 
visitation provisions of a court order is made and denied, the 
court may order the petitioner to pay the reasonable attorney's 
fees expended by the prevailing party in that action, if the 
court determines that the petition was without merit and not 
asserted in good faith. 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
Kathleen Clontz, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Harvey James Clontz, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Before Judges Davidson, Bench and Orme (On Rule 31 Hearing) 
ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE 
Case No. 860200-CA 
Pursuant to Rule 31 of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, 
the judgment of the Second District Court in the above-captioned 
appeal is affirmed. 
DATED this day of October, 1987. 
FOR THE COURT: 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
/ ^ % 
Gregory^jC. Orme, Judge 
F1L 
u o j JLO 138/ 
Timofhy M. Shea 
Clerk of tta Court 
Utah Court of Appeals 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 16th day of October, 1987, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Order of Affirmance was mailed to each 
of the following: 
Deirdre A. Gorman 
Attorney at Law 
Farr, Kaufman & Hamilton 
Bamberger Square, Building I 
205 - 26th Street, Suite 34 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Pete N. Vlahos, Esq, 
Vlahos & Sharp 
Legal Forum Building 
2447 Kiesel Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Hon. David E. Roth, 
Second District Court 
Weber County 
Dist. Ct. #92534 
M\ 
JuliaMn&tfield 
Case Management Clerk 
PETE N. VLAHOS, ESQ. , #3337 
VLAHOS & SHARP 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Legal Forum Building 
2447 Kiesel Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: 621-2464 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
KATHLEEN CLONTZ, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
HARVEY JAMES CLONTZ, 
Defendant. 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 92534 
This matter having come on regularly for trial on the 
25th day of March, 1986, before the Honorable David E. Roth,, 
one of the Judges of the above entitled Court sitting with-
out a jury, and the Plaintiff appearing in person and with 
her attorney, Pete N. Vlahos, and the Defendant appearing in 
person and with his attorney, John Blair Hutchison, and it 
having been shown that the Defendant was duly served with a 
copy of a Complaint and a copy of the Summons, and wherein 
the Defendant filed his responsive pleadings, and each of 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
•\ 
-y 
>> 
"*> 
•V 
z 
> 
< 
...J 
H 
< 
'J) 
UJ 
z 
a: 
o 
o 
Z U J r -
_j Z -3-
5 U i = 6 
a < i 
cc co -> 
o y z 
^ * ui 
< t^ O 
the parties having been sworn and testifying in their own 
behalf, proffers of proof having been made to the Court in 
chambers concerning several items, that exhibits having been 
offered and received, and the Court being fully cognizant of 
all matters pertaining therein, enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That Plaintiff has been a resident o ^  Weber County, 
State of Utah for at least three (3) months prior to the 
commencement of this action. 
2. That Plaintiff and Defendant were married in 
Sunset, Utah on the 7th day of March, 1959, and ever since 
said time have been and still are husband and wife; that 
there has been born as issue of this marriage five (5) 
children, and that all five (5) children are now emanci-
pated. 
3. That the Defendant has treated the Plaintiff cruel-, 
ly, causing her great mental distress and anguish, in that 
the Defendant has been argumentative, has threatened the 
Plaintiff, and that the Plaintiff is fearful of the Defen-
dant. 
4. That during the course of the marriage, the parties 
herein have acquired an equity in a home located at 3867 
West 2700 South in Syracuse, Utah, and the Court finds that 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
the land and home have a value of $61,500.00; that the Court 
finds that the land was given to the Defendant and can be 
traced, and at the time of the giving back in 1962, had a 
value of $600.00, that the present value of the land is 
$16,000.00, but there has been $1,000.00 worth of improve-
ment on the land. 
5. That the parties, during the course of the ferri-
age, have acquired personal property as evidenced by the 
exhibit introduced in Court, and in addition, the Plaintiff 
has a 1983 Mercury automobile, which has a fair market value 
of $7,500.00, with a mortgage balance of $3,100.00, having a 
net equity of $4,400.00; that the Defendant has a 1985 GMC 
4x4 truck having a value of $10,000.00, with a mortgage 
balance of $7,63 2.00, leaving an equity of $2,368.00; and 
that the Plaintiff has purchased a mobile home since the 
parties separated, and that the mobile home has an equity of. 
approximately $300.00. 
6. That during the course of the marriage, the parties 
herein have incurred certain debts, to-wit: Approximately 
$18,500.00 due and owing on the trailer Plaintiff purchased 
since the parties separated, approximately $3,100.00 due and 
owing on the 1983 Mercury automobile, approximately 
$7,632.00 due and owing on the 1985 GMC truck, and that the 
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parties have incurred debts and obligations since they 
separated. 
7. That the Plaintiff is employed at Hill Air Force 
Base and has a retirement; and that the Defendant is pre-
sently retired and receives income in excess of $650.00 per 
month, and the Court finds that the vested retirement of the 
Plaintiff and the present value of the Defendant's ri g < 11 to 
receive the retirement is far in excess of the $15,000.00 
that the Plaintiff has vested; that the Court believes that 
if a present value was placed on the Defendant's r e t i r e m e n t 
it would be somewhere around $50,000.00. 
8. That the Court finds that the Defendant is employ-
able, in fact, the Defendant has been employed in the past, 
that he is presently looking for work and will have to find 
employment if he needs more than the $650.00 retirement. 
9. That during the course of the marriage, the parties, 
herein have also acquired thirteen (13) $25.00 face value 
U.S. Savings Bonds. 
10. That the Court finds that each of the parties has 
submitted lists showing the value of items of property, 
which are drastically different in valuation, including the 
drastic difference in the diamonds and miscellaneous jewelry 
that Plaintiff has, and the Court finds that the value of 
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Plaintiff's jewelry is equivalent to the value of the Defen-
dant's guns, and the Court finds there is about $600.00 or 
$700.00 valuation on each side concerning those items. 
11. That the Court finds that in comparing the two (2) 
lists, the only real item that appears to be in dispute is 
the Zenith television set requested by the Plaintiff. 
12. That the Court finds that the Plaintiff received 
money from her inheritance, which she has kept in a separate 
account and also has a joint account with her mother, which 
is not a marital asset, and that the Defendant had a savings 
account in his name, which was depleted from approximately 
$6,000.00 down to about $400.00. 
13. That the Defendant has incurred attorney fees and 
costs in the sum of $800.00. 
14. That the Plaintiff will maintain health and acci-
dent insurance for the Defendant if it is available through, 
her place of employment. 
From the above and foregoing Findings of Fact, the 
Court arrives at the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That the Plaintiff, Kathleen Clontz, is entitled to 
a Decree of Divorce from the Defendant, Harvey James Clontz, 
said divorce to become final upon the signing and entry. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
2. That the Plaintiff shall be awarded a lien in the 
family home in the sum of $23,250.00, said lien is deter-
mined by the Court as follows: That the Defendant shall be 
awarded the first $15,000.00 from the total value of the 
home, which is $61,500.00, which was from the Defendant's 
father and had a value of $600.00 when it was given to the 
Defendant b a c k in 1962, and t he $1,000.00 has been improve-
ments, so that the appraised value of the land, which was 
$1,600.00 will be reduced to $1,500.00, leaving a net equity 
of $46,500.00, with Plaintiff to receive $23,25.0.00. 
3. That Plaintiff is entitled to receive her money 
from the home within six (6) months and he must either 
mortgage the home to pay the Plaintiff or sell it, but must 
cash her out within six (6) months. 
4. That each of the parties are awarded their own 
individual retirements. 
5. That neither party is awarded any alimony. 
6. That Plaintiff is awarded her house trailer, sub-
ject to the existing mortgage; the 1983 Mercury automobile, 
subject to the mortgage balance; and those checking and 
savings accounts in her name and in the name of Plaintiff's 
mother. 
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7. That the Defendant is awarded his 1985 GMC 4x4 
truck, subject to the indebtedness and those savings and 
checking accounts in his name. 
8. That Plaintiff is to receive those items set forth 
in her exhibit, plus those additional items that Defendant 
in his exhibit is willing to give to the Plaintiff, and the 
Defendant shall receive those items on his list, plus those 
additional items that Plaintiff is willing to give him. 
9. That the items awarded to the Plaintiff are as 
follows: Zenith television, old poster bed with dresser, 
five (5) Big 0 tires, two (2) snow tires on rims, wrought 
iron bed belonging to Plaintiff's grandmother, cedar chest, 
rain lamp, antique sewing machine, cream separater, milk can 
belonging to grandparents, portapote, round mirror, swan 
mirror belonged to grandparents, stereo-record combination, 
one-half (%) of the dishes, macrame, suitcases, hair dryer^ 
rug with Indian dolls, crafts that Plaintiff has made, two 
(2) statues, toy box made by Plaintiff's father, personal 
belongings, cuckoo clock and/or cocker c 1 ock given to Plain-
tiff by her sister, bug killer, knick-knacks, three (3) 
drawer cabinet, stereo-record player combination, one-half 
ih) of the picture albums of the children, diamonds and 
miscellaneous jewelry, glue gun, lamp, rocking chair, micro-
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wave oven and stand, kitchen utensils in Plaintiff s posses-
sion, couch sold by Plaintiff to the parties' daughter, 
computer and those items of property she has in her posses-
sion, 
10. That the Defendant shall be awarded the 1985 GMC 
4x4 truck, 16 horse power garden tractor, caterpillar, 
landscaping trailer, tent trailer, fishing boat with motor, 
the inoperative Zenith television with the operative Zenith 
television awarded to the Plaintiff, clothes washer and 
dryer, fan and kitchen appliances, kitchen utensils in 
possession, kitchen dining room set, rifles and rounds of 
ammunition, deep freeze, refrigerator, couch, wood burning 
stove, RCA television, camp trailer and supplies, blond 
bedroom set, waterbed, extra dresser and chest of drawers, 
kitchen set hardwood or maple, Defendant's tools, telescope, 
power head to Rainbow vacuum and his personal belongings. 
11. That the Plaintiff shall be awarded the thirteen 
(13) U.S. Savings Bonds, however they are to be divided 
equally in value, with Plaintiff to determine the value of 
the bonds and one-half (^ ) the value to be awarded to the 
Defendant, and that the total value of the thirteen (13) 
bonds is $410.06, of which the Defendant is entitled to 
$205.03. 
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12. That the Plaintiff is entitled to pick up the items 
awarded to her on Saturday, April 12, 1986, at 10:00 a.m. 
13. That Plaintiff is ordered to pay Defendant's attor-
ney, John Blair Hutchison, the sum of $800.00, and said sum 
has been paid in full. 
DATED this day of April, 1986. 
DAVID E. ROTH, 
FINDINGS OF 
CONCLUSIONS 
FACT AND 
OF LAW 
PETE N. VLAHOS, ESQ. , #3337 
VLAHOS & SHARP 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Legal Forum Building 
2447 Kiesel Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: 621-2464 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
KATHLEEN CLOMTZ, / 
Plaintiff, / DECREE OF DIVORCE 
vs. / 
HARVEY JAMES CLONTZ, / Civil No. 92534 
Defendant. / 
This matter having come on regularly for trial on the 
25th day of March, 1986, before the Honorable David E. Roth,, 
one of the Judges of the above entitled Court sitting with-
out a jury, and the Plaintiff appearing in person and with 
her attorney, Pete N. Vlahos, and the Defendant appearing in 
person and with his attorney, John Blair Hutchison, and it 
having been shown that the Defendant was duly served with a 
copy of a Complaint and a copy of the Summons, and wherein 
the Defendant filed his responsive pleadings, and each of 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 1 
the parties having been sworn and testifying in their own 
behalf, proffers of proof having been made to the Court in 
chambers concerning several items, that exhibits having been 
offered and received, and the Court being fully cognizant of 
all matters pertaining therein, and having made its Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, separately stated in writ-
ing, NOW THEREFORE, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. That the Plaintiff, Kathleen Clontz, is granted a 
Decree of Divorce from the Defendant, Harvey James Clontz, 
said divorce to become final upon the signing and entry. 
2. That the Plaintiff is awarded a lien in the family 
home in the sum of $23,250.00, said lien is determined by 
the Court as follows: That the Defendant is awarded the 
first $15,000.00 from the total value of the home, which is 
$51,500.00, which was from the Defendant's father and had a, 
value of $600.00 when it was given to the Defendant back in 
1962, and the $1,000.00 has been improvements, so that the 
appraised value of the land, which was $1,600.00 will be 
reduced to $1,500.00, leaving a net equity of $46,500.00, 
with Plaintiff to receive $23,250.00. 
3. That Plaintiff is entitled to receive her money 
from the home within six (6) months and he must either 
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mortgage the home to pay the Plaintiff or sell .it, but must 
cash her out within six (6) months. 
4. That each of the parties are awarded their own 
individual retirements. 
5. That neither party is awarded any alimony. 
6. That Plaintiff is awarded her house trailer, sub-
ject to the existing mortgage; the 1983 Mercury automobile, 
subject to the mortgage balance; and those checking and 
savings accounts in her name and in the name of Plaintiff's 
mother. 
7. That the Defendant is awarded her 1985 CMC 4x4 
truck, subject to the indebtedness and those savings and 
checking accounts in his name. 
8. That Plaintiff is to receive those items set forth 
in her exhibit, plus those additional items that Defendant 
in his exhibit is willing to give to the Plaintiff, and the, 
Defendant shall receive those items on his list, plus those 
additional items that Plaintiff is willing to give him. 
9. That the items awarded to the Plaintiff are as 
follows: Zenith television, old poster bed with dresser, 
five (5) Big 0 tires, two (2) snow tires on rims, wrought 
iron bed belonging to Plaintiff's grandmother, cedar chest, 
rain lamp, antique sewing machine, cream separater, milk can 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 3 
belonging to grandparents, portapote, round mirror, swan 
mirror belonged to grandparents, stereo-record combination, 
one-half (h) of the dishes, macrame, suitcases, hair dryer, 
rug with Indian dolls, crafts that Plaintiff has made, two 
(2) statues, toy box made by Plaintiff's father, personal 
belongings, cuckoo clock and/or cocker clock given to Plain-
tiff by her sister, bug killer, knick-knacks, three (3) 
drawer cabinet, stereo-record player combination, one-half 
(h) of the picture albums of the children, diamonds and 
miscellaneous jewelry, glue gun, lamp, rocking chair, micro-
wave oven and stand, kitchen utensils in Plaintiff's posses-
sion, couch sold by Plaintiff to the parties' daughter, 
computer and those items of property she has in her posses-
sion. 
10. That the Defendant is awarded the 1985 GMC 4x4 
truck, 16 horse power garden tractor, caterpillar, landscap-
ing trailer, tent trailer, fishing boat with motor, the 
inoperative Zenith television with the operative Zenith 
television awarded to the Plaintiff, clothes washer and 
dryer, fan and kitchen appliances, kitchen utensils in 
possession, kitchen dining room set, rifles and rounds of 
ammunition, deep freeze, refrigerator, couch, wood burning 
stove, RCA television, camp trailer and supplies, blond 
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bedroom set, waterbed, extra dresser and chest of drawers, 
kitchen set hardwood or maple, Defendant's tools, telescope, 
power head to Rainbow vacuum and his personal belongings. 
11. That the Plaintiff is awarded the thirteen (13) 
U.S. Savings Bonds, however they are to be divided equally 
in value, with Plaintiff to determine the value of the bonds 
and one-half {h) the value to be awarded to the Defendant, 
and that the total value of the thirteen (13) bonds is 
$410,06, of which the Defendant is entitled to $205.03. 
12. That the Plaintiff is entitled to pick up the items 
awarded to her on Saturday, April 12, 1986, at 10:00 a.m. 
13. That Plaintiff is ordered to pay Defendant's attor-
ney, John Blair Hutchison, the sum of $800.00, and said sum 
has been paid in full. 
DATED this day of April, 1986. 
DAVID E. ROTH, 
District Court Judge 
PPR0VED AS TO 
IHN BLAIR HUTCHISON, 
//Attorney for Defendant 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
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appropriate, the court erred in providing that 
alimony continue until age 65 without regard 
to the possibility of remarriage, cohabitation, 
complained that although the trial court j 
awarded him 50% of the equity in the marital j 
home, it permitted plaintiff the right to live in j 
the home for five years without any provision 
that interest would accrue on the equity share - j 
- the substantial investment - he had in j 
the home. 
As.to the first issue, the alimony awarded 
by the trial court is really on the low end of 
what is appropriate under the doctrine reiter-
ated in Paffel in view of the parties' ages and 
education, as well as the length of their mar-
riage and the substantial disparity in their 
incomes. It is a modest award and defendant 
cannot have reasonably thought there was any 
remote possibility of it being disturbed on 
appeal. 
The second issue is equally frivolous. Alt-
hough the decree recited that alimony would 
continue until defendant's former wife 
reached 65 and did not expressly refer to 
earlier termination upon her remarriage or 
other change of circumstance, defendant's 
c&T&scTi Y8» a&tatyeA. V$ *\&V&&. \i\aSa. Cote 
Ann. §30-3-5(5) (1986) provides that 
unless a decree of divorce "specifically prov-
ides otherwise," an award of alimony termin-
ates upon remarriage. Section 30-3-5(6) 
provides that alimony also terminates upon 
cohabitation unless the arrangement is free of 
sexual contact. At oral argument, defendant 
asserted that his concern was that the "until 
age 65" language might be deemed to mean 
the decree had "specifically provide[d] other-
wise" and required alimony be paid until age 
65 regardless of whether plaintiff remarried. 
Taking an appeal to obtain clarification and 
reassurance on that point is clearly overkill. 
Plaintiff immediately conceded that under the 
statute alimony would ^of course terminate 
before age 65 should the plaintiff remarry or 
take on a male roommate. Timely objection 
to the phraseology of the decree, motion for 
clarification, or even a letter to opposing 
counsel would have readily elicited all the 
comfort defendant desired on this score. And 
as the majority points out, the continuing 
udes the conclusion that, even absent remarr-
iage or cohabitation, defendant would be 
obligated to keep paying alimony until his ex-
wife reached age 65 regardless of changes in 
the parties' circumstances. 
It is the third issue which, in my judgment, 
keeps defendant's appeal outside the realm of 
frivolousness. When a residence, is a major 
marital asset, it has Income quite common to 
order it sold and the net proceeds divided. 
When the needs of the parties or their children 
require, it is equally common to defer the time 
of sale. In the latter situation, however, and 
^specially for a period as long as five full 
years, it is to be expected that the equity share 
pf the spouse who does not have the pre-sale 
reasonable rate, even though that interest 
might not be payable until the sale proceeds 
are available. Such a provision is necessary to 
compensate the spouse who has to find som-
eplace else to live without access to his or her 
substantial investment which remains tied up 
in his or her former home. Failure to include a 
provision for interest would, in my judgment, 
ordinarily constitute an abuse of discretion 
where the period during which sale is deferred 
is of more than incidental duration. Although 
I, like the majority, believe no abuse was 
committed in this particular case, chiefly 
because the alimony award as such was quite 
meager, I believe defendant was entitled to our 
review of that issue to make sure this was 
indeed one of those rare situations where a 
"no interest" provision would pass muster. 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge . 
j Cite as 
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IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Vanza Eckersley BOYLE, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Mark K. BOYLE, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Before Judges Garff, Greenwood, and Bench. 
No. 860004-CA 
FILED: April 15, 1987 
THIRD DISTRICT 
Hon. Scott Daniels 
ATTORNEYS: 
Bruce E. Coke, Larry A. Kirkham for 
Plaintiff and Appellant. 
Paul H. Liapis, Kent M. Kasting for 
OPINION 
GREENWOOD, Judge: 
Plaintiff appeals from a Decree of Divorce 
which distributed property and debts between 
the parties, cancelled pre-marital note exec-
uted by; defendant in favor of plaintiff, denied 
plaintiff alimony^ and granted a divorce to. 
both parties. -% ,.,..>,..,,„....,. ,^  .
 n 
The parties married in 1974 when: rjdalntifi| 
was 56 years old and.defendanr^63#BotI^itS3| 
^prior marriages. They separated in-1981 -an& 
For complete Utah Code Annotations, consult Code •Go's Annotation Service 
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had no children born of their marriage. Prior 
to the marriage plaintiff owned a home and 
had substantial savings. Defendant borrowed 
$8,000 from plaintiff for payment of taxes 
prior to the marriage and executed a note 
reflecting that loan. Some repayment occu-
rred after the marriage. Plaintiffs assets were 
partially depleted during the marriage by 
purchase of a home and automobiles. Plain-
tiff also provided funds to defendant for 
payment of gambling debts. Defendant, an 
attorney, contributed his income during the 
marriage to the couple's living expenses. 
Plaintiff deposited $9,300 of her pre-marital 
assets in a joint Merrill Lynch account with an 
initial total balance of $20,000. After the 
parties separated they each withdrew funds 
from the Merrill Lynch account, creating an 
overdraft of approximately $10,000. 
After three days of trial the trial court 
awarded plaintiff the home of the parties 
subject to the mortgage obligation, the hous-
ehold furnishings, a 1975 Cadillac, a savings 
account in her name, and various personal 
items. Plaintiff and defendant were each 
ordered to repay one-half of the Merrill 
Lynch overdraft balance. Defendant was 
awarded his Keogh plan, a country club 
membership, a 1975 Blazer, his pension plan, 
and various personal items. Defendant was 
also ordered to pay plaintiffs medical bills 
and all back taxes owed through 1981. 
Plaintiff asserts that the trial court abused 
its discretion by (1) refusing to order defen-
dant to pay to plaintiff the balance of the 
$8,000 note and other sums advanced fay pla-
intiff to defendant during the marriage for 
payment of gambling debts; (2) ordering pla-
intiff to pay one-half of the Merrill Lynch 
overdraft; (3) failing to award plaintiff 
alimony; and (4) granting a divorce to defen-
dant as well as to plaintiff. We disagree and 
affirm the decision of the trial court. ; 
This Court will refrain from disturbing 
findings of the trial court in a divorce action 
unless a clear abuse of discretion is shown. 
Searle v, Searle, 522 P.2d 697 (Utah 1974). 
The triai court is dearly in the best position to 
weigh the evidence, determine credibility and 
arrive at factual conclusions. In this case the 
trial judge considered all evidence presented as 
to the marital assets and debts as they existed 
prior to and during the marriage, and subse-
quent to the separation of the parties. It 
would be inappropriate for this Court to 
reverse on an isolated item of property or debt 
distribution. Rather, this Court must examine 
the entire distribution to determine if the trial 
court abused its discretion. 
The findings of fact do not include dollar 
values for most of the property, and debts 
distributed, nor does the record indicate any 
effort by plaintiffs counsel, who drafted 
those pleadings for court approval, to have 
such amounts delineated. In Jones' v. Jones, 
700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985), appellant claimed 
that the trial court had improperly distributed 
property. The Utah Supreme Court stated 
that findings of fact must include valuation of 
assets in order to permit appellate review. In 
Jones, as here, counsel for the party seeking 
such review had prepared the findings of fact, 
conclusions of law and decree of divorce and 
had not included, nor attempted to include, 
values in those pleadings. The Supreme Court 
declined to disturb the property distribution, 
stating that such claim had been waived 
because the party seeking reversal failed to 
attempt to include property values in the fin-
dings of fact. Jones at 1074-75. We agree 
that a failure to include property valuations in 
divorce actions may, in some cases, constitute 
an abuse of discretion fufficient to require 
remand for determination of values. However, 
when the lack of valuation results from the 
complaining party's own draftsmanship and 
no clear abuse of discretion is otherwise 
proven, we will defer to the trial court's pro-
perty distribution. Those factors exist in the 
case before us and we therefore affirm as to 
property and debt division. 
Plaintiff claims the court further abused its 
discretion by failing to award her alimony. 
Medical testimony was received regarding 
plaintiffs asthma condition and the adverse 
effect on her ability to be employed. Cross-
examination indicated that plaintiff was able 
to golf frequently despite the asthma, and had 
been the runner-up in a competition held at 
Willow Creek Country Club in 1982. Defen-
dant testified that income from his law prac-
tice had diminished dramatically. His area of 
practice, motor carrier transportation law, had 
suffered from the deregulation of that indu-
stry. Also, his major client had terminated 
their relationship. Defendant anticipated a 
continued reduction of his salary for those 
reasons. The court refused plaintiffs request 
to include a finding that plaintiff was unable 
to work. The findings, however, do include 
the following language: 
That this was not a long term 
marriage, and the court feels that 
each party is being restored to the 
condition which existed at the time 
of the marriage, and therefore no 
a l imony should be awarded. 
(Findings of Fact No. 18). 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that the 
purpose of alimony is to equalize the standard 
of living for both spouses, maintain them at 
their present standard as much as possible, 
and avoid the necessity of one spouse receiving 
public assistance. Higley v. Higley, 676 P.2d 
379 (Utah 1983). In Jones, the Court reiter-
ated the factors to be examined in determining 
alimony as including:; 
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[1J the financial conditions and 
needs of the wife; 
[2] the ability of the wife to 
produce a sufficient income for 
herself; and 
[3] the ability of the husband to 
provide support. Jones at 1075. 
These criteria were previously adopted in 
English v. English, 565 P.2d 409, 411-12 
(Utah 1977). In Jones the Court examined the 
record for an analysis of the criteria, and 
considered, among other things, the length of 
the marriage and the recipient spouse's educ-
ation and employability. The Jones analysis 
process made it clear that the three pronged 
criterion does not preclude considering factors 
such as the length of the marriage in awarding 
alimony. 
In Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96 (Utah 1986) 
the Utah Supreme Court recently listed the 
same three factors and stated that "[daiiure to 
consider these factors constitutes an abuse of 
discretion." In Paffel the trial courts find-
ings did not specifically address all of the 
required factors. This Court concurs in the 
Supreme Court's reflection that more detailed 
findings on each required factor would assist 
in the appellate process. However, we find, as 
did the Supreme Court in Paffel, that "the 
evidence in this case supports the lower 
court's order and appellant has made no 
showing to rebut the presumption that the trial 
court did consider respondent's income, exp-
enses, and need for support." Id at 102. The 
third factor, defendant's ability to provide 
support, was also considered by the trial court 
in this case. Appellant was awarded most of 
the marital estate as well as the residue of her 
premarital assets. She had received several 
months of temporary support to give her an 
opportunity to rehabilitate. Evidence was i 
received and disputed as to plaintiff's ability 
to obtain employment, given her health con-
ditions. Plaintiff had worked up to eight 
years prior to the marriage of the parties. 
Defendant testified that his income had decr-
eased and was not likely to increase, because 
of the change in the nature of his law practice. 
The short marriage of the parties resulted in 
diminution of both plaintiffs assets and def-
endant's earning abilities. The trial court 
considered all proffered evidence and rendered I 
a decision to equalize, as far as possible,, the 
adverse impact of the divorce on both. All | 
three of the factors required by Paffel were 
considered by the court. This court finds no 
abuse of discretion in the denial of alimony. 
There is no merit in plaintiffs contention 
that defendant should not have been granted a 
divorce. Both parties testified ;On their 
grounds for divorce and it was within the \ 
sound discretion of the trial judge to grant a 
divorce to both. 
Affirmed. Costs to defendant. 
For complete Utah Code Annotations, 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
R. W. Garff, Judge 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
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OPINION 
BENCH, Judge: 
Plaintiffs Walter and Ruth Katzenberger 
appeal from a summary judgment dismissing 
their action for reformation of a deed and 
from a judgment against them for trespass and 
intentional interference with contractual rela-
tions. We reverse the summary judgment and 
remand the case for trial. 
In early September, 1970, plaintiffs conta-
cted the then Utah Department of Highways, 
now defendant Utah Department rf Transp-
ortation, to inquire about purchasing a small 
pie-shaped piece of property located between 
the eastern boundary of their property and the 
1-215 Belt Route fence. Letter and telephone 
negotiations ensued. Thev State indicated a 
willingness to sell the property^and quoted a 
prjreof $25,<X). O n ^ 
Katzenberger mailed a check in tliat amount to 
the State Road Commission. In a cover letter 
which accompanied the check, she indicated 
1 the check was "for [the] property we have 
consult Code • Co's Annotation Service 
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3. There is no indication of what disposition was 
made of that charge. One Porsche, 526 P.2d at 
917. 
4. Without legal analysis or authority, Honda con-
tends that One Pontiac is not controlling because 
the decision post-dates* the trial. We decline to 
enter into a detailed analysis of this issue, State v. 
Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984), except 
to say that Honda's contention is without merit. 
See Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-
07 (1971). For cases construing similar statutory 
language see, e.g., U.S. v. One (1) 1982 28' Inter-
national Vessel, 741 F.2d 1319 (11th Cir. 1984); 
U.S. v. One 1975 Mercedes 280S, 590 F.2d 196 (6th 
Cir. 1978); U.S. v. One 1975 Ford Pickup Truck, 
558 F.2d 755 (5th Cir. 1977); Calero-Toledo v. 
Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974). 
Cite as 
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OPINION 
DAVIDSON, Judge: 
The trial court granted a divorce to plaintiff 
Joan Eames from defendant Emerson Eames. 
The Judgment and Decree provided for a 
distribution of property and an award of 
alimony to plaintiff. On appeal, defendant 
seeks a reversal of the trial court's judgment 
as it relates to alimony and distribution of 
property. We affirm. 
The parties were married for thirty years 
with three children born to the union. At the 
time of trial in January, 1984, the youngest 
child was 18 years old and resided with plai-
ntiff in the family home while she attended 
college.' Defendant had moved to a "different 
l residence: Plaintiff was employed as a depa-
rtment manager and clerk for a large store and 
her gross income was approximately $10,000 
per year. She had been employed during 
most of the marriage in unskilled or untrained 
type positions. Mr. Eames was a manufact-
uring engineer with Morton-Thiokol and had 
worked with that corporation since 1962. His 
gross income was approximately $34,000 per 
year. Because the parties placed widely 
varying valuations on their items of personal 
property, the trial judge made the division 
without finding specific values for each item. 
In addition to her share of the personal pro-
perty, the plaintiff received her equity in a 
partnership consisting of members of her 
paternal family (Five Way Partnership), pre-
vious distributions from this partnership, her 
inherited property, gifts from her father, and 
a one-half interest in the family home. 
Plaintiff was given the right to live in the 
home until February 1, 1989, or until it was 
sold by agreement of the parties, whichever 
came first. While in the home, Mrs. Eames 
was responsible for payment of taxes, insur-
ance, and mortgage installments. Defendant 
received his share of the personal property, his 
separate bank account, the inheritance from 
his parents, and an undivided one-half inte-
rest in the family home less the mortgage 
indebtedness at the time of trial. Each party-
received one-half of the other's retirement 
benefit, to be paid when it was received. This 
provision was subject to the approved formula 
which considers the number of years worked 
during the marriage. Defendant's retirement 
was vested while the plaintiff's was not, his 
being much more valuable than hers. 
Plaintiff was awarded alimony in the 
amount of $450.00 per month so long as the 
youngest child successfully pursued a full lime 
college education, lived in the family home, 
remained single, or reached the age of 21 
years. Then alimony was reduced to $300.00 
per month and would remain so until plaintiff 
reached the age of 65 years. At that time 
alimony would terminate. 
Defendant claims error in the distribution of 
the real and personal property of the parties 
and in the award of alimony. The trial court 
has statutory authority to decree an equitable 
distribution of property in a divorce action 
under Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (1986). 
In the case of King v: King, 111 P.2d 715 
(Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court emph-
asized that it would accord considerable def-
erence to the trial court's judgment and treat 
its findings with a presumption of validity. An 
appellant has the burden of showing that the 
trial court's award "works such a manifest 
injustice or inequity as to clearly be an abuse 
of that broad discretion [in adjusting the fin-
ancial needs and property interests of the 
parties]/ ,. , . ; : / v 
The trial record exposes the disparities in 
education, income, and earning potential 
between the parties. The record also reveals 
that any future income from the Five Way 
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Partnership will be considerably less than 
defendant asserts. Defendant's claimed right 
to receive interest on his one-half interest in 
the home's equity for the period until Febr-
uary 1, 1989, is offset by the plaintiffs need 
to provide shelter and support for the parties' 
youngest child while she attends college. It is 
presumed the trial judge took these economic 
realities into consideration and, on balance, it 
can be said that he strove for an equitable 
distribution of the property. 
A recent Utah Supreme Court opinion 
concerning alimony, Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 
96, 100 (Utah 1986), states that the purpose of 
spousal support is to "enable the receiving 
spouse to maintain as nearly as possible the 
standard of living enjoyed during the marriage 
and to prevent the spouse from becoming a 
public charge/ The appellate courts should 
not interfere with such an award without a 
showing of a ''clear and prejudicial abuse of 
discretion". The Court in Paffel further set 
. forth what must be considered by the trial 
court to avoid a challenge to the award as 
being an abuse of discretion. These factors 
are, (1) the financial condition and needs of 
the spouse claiming support, (2) the ability of 
that spouse to provide sufficient income for 
him or herself, and (3) the ability of the res-
ponding spouse [Mr. Eames] to provide the 
support. The trial record here shows that the 
court below carefully and properly considered 
the above factors. There was no abuse of 
discretion. Therefore, the award of alimony 
will not be disturbed. 
Plaintiff requests attorney's fees on appeal. 
This issue is governed by R. Utah Ct. App: 
33(a) in that this Court may award costs and 
attorney's fees to the prevailing party if we 
determine the appeal to be either frivolous or 
brought for delay. The instant appeal is 
without merit but the record must be exam-
ined to determine whether or not it is frivolous 
or brought for delay. In Cady v. Johnson, 
671 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1983), the Court 
implied the awarding of attorney's fees requ-
ired a finding that the suit was lacking in good 
faith and then defined "good faith" as: 
(1) An honest belief in the propriety 
of the activities in question; 
(2) no intent to take unconscionable 
advantage of others; and 
(3) no intent to, or knowledge of 
the fact that the, activities in ques-
tion will, [sic] hinder, delay or 
defraud others. 
The Court recognizes the right of a party to 
argue in an attempt to correct what that party 
deems to be error in the court below. 
However, when there is no basis for the arg-
ument presented and when the evidence or law 
is mischaracterized and misstated, the Court 
must question the party's motives. The 
record shows the trial judge making Findings 
cher v. Fletcher, 
1980), which was 
of Fact, dividing tjhe property, and awarding 
support after a careful consideration of all the 
evidence. Defendant ignores this. Mr. Eames 
claims the trial court erred in awarding 
alimony to his wifp. This attempt at depriv-
ation of alimony is cjontrary to the intent of F/er-
615 P.2d 1218 (Utah 
^ited in defendant's brief. 
Surely a wife of tturty years deserves somet-
hing more than being cast adrift in the sea of 
economic uncertainty without some long term 
support from a husband with superior earning 
potential. Defendant refuses to accept the 
evidence presented concerning plaintiffs int-
erest in the Five Way Partnership. He conti-
nues to argue that the interest is of great and 
increasing value. He refuses to acknowledge 
the uncontroverted evidence that past distrib-
utions resulted from the sale of assets. He 
incorrectly argues for a valuation based upon 
the past rather than a valuation at the time of 
trial. Defendant also'fails to recognize that he 
was awarded his own inheritance and fails to 
consider any income potential from that 
source. 
Defendant further misstates the law when he. 
argues that the alimony award cannot be 
changed in the future. Utah Code Ann. §30-
3-5 (1986) specifically reserves jurisdiction to 
the trial court to "make subsequent changes or 
new orders for the support and maintenance 
of the parties...." 
The totality of defendant's argument 
compels this Court to find that he is attemp-
ting to take unconscionable advantage of his 
wife and that this appeal is frivolous. There-
fore, it fails to meet the standards of good 
faith and R. Utah Ct. App. 33(a) applies. 
We affirm the judgment of the trial court, 
award costs against the defendant, and 
remand to the trial court for a determination 
of plaintiff's attorney's fees which are 
ordered to be paid by the defendant. 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
I CONCUR: 
Regnal W. Garff, Judge 
ORME, Judge: (Dissenting in part) 
I agree with the majority that the decision 
below must be affirmed. The trial court's 
disposition is well within the realm of reaso-
nableness and no abuse of discretion has been 
demonstrated. While I agree the appeal is not 
well taken, I am not convinced it was frivol-
ously taken and I dissent from the majority's 
imposition of attorney's fees against defen-
dant. 
Defendant had three major gripes with the 
trial court's decision. First, he did not think 
any alimony should have been awarded 
because' his former wife is able-bodied and 
gainfully employed; Second, he contended 
that even if some award of alimony were 
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appropriate, the court erred in providing that 
alimony continue until age 65 without regard 
to the possibility of remarriage, cohabitation, 
or other changed circumstance. Finally, he 
complained that although the trial court 
awarded him 50% of the equity in the marital 
home, it permitted plaintiff the right to live in 
the home for five years without any provision 
that interest would accrue on the equity share -
- the substantial investment — he had in 
the home. 
As to the first issue, the alimony awarded 
by the trial court is really on the low end of 
what is appropriate under the doctrine reiter-
ated in Paffel in view of the parties' ages and 
education, as well as the length of their mar-
riage and the substantial disparity in their 
incomes. It is a modest award and defendant 
cannot have reasonably thought there was any 
remote possibility of it being disturbed on 
appeal. 
The second issue is equally frivolous. Alt-
hough the decree recited that alimony would 
continue until defendant's former wife 
reached 65 and did not expressly refer to 
earlier termination upon her remarriage or 
other change of circumstance, defendant's 
concern is allayed by statute. Utah Code 
Ann. §30-3-5(5) (1986) provides that 
unless a decree of divorce "specifically prov-
ides otherwise," an award of alimony termin-
ates upon remarriage. Section 30-3-5(6) 
provides that alimony also terminates upon 
cohabitation unless the arrangement is free of 
sexual contact. At oral argument, defendant 
asserted that his concern was that the "until 
age 65" language might be deemed to mean 
the decree had "specifically provide[d] other-
wise" and required alimony be paid until age 
65 regardless of whether plaintiff remarried. 
Taking an appeal to obtain clarification and 
reassurance on that point is clearly overkill. 
Plaintiff immediately conceded that under the 
statute alimony would of course terminate 
before age 65 should the plaintiff remarry or 
take on a male roommate. Timely objection 
to the phraseology of the decree, motion for 
clarification, or even a letter to opposing 
counsel would have readily elicited all the 
comfort defendant desired on this score. And 
as the majority points out, the continuing 
jurisdiction provision of §30-3-5(3) precl-
udes the conclusion that, even absent remarr-
iage or cohabitation, defendant would be 
obligated to keep paying alimony until his ex-
wife reached age 65 regardless of changes in 
the parties' circumstances. 
It is the third issue which, in my judgment, 
keeps defendant's appeal outside the realm of 
frivolousness. When a residence is a major 
marital asset, it has become quite common to 
order it sold and the net proceeds divided. 
When the needs of the parties or their children 
require, it is equally common to defer the time 
of sale. In the latter situation, however, and 
~~ For complete Utah Code Annota t ions , 
especially for a period as long as five full 
years, it is to be expected that the equity share 
of the spouse who does not have the pre-sale 
use of the home will accrue interest at some 
reasonable rate, even though that interest 
might not be payable until the sale proceeds 
are available. Such a provision is necessary to 
compensate the spouse who has to find som-
eplace else to live without access to his or her 
substantial investment which remains tied up 
in his or her former home. Failure to include a 
provision for interest would, in my judgment, 
ordinarily constitute an abuse of discretion 
where the period during which sale is deferred 
is of more than incidental duration. Although 
1, like the majority, believe no abuse was 
committed in this particular case, chiefly 
because the alimony award as such was quite 
meager, I believe defendant was entitled to our 
review of that issue to make sure this was 
indeed one of those rare situations where a 
"no interest" provision would pass muster. 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
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OPINION 
GREENWOOD, Judge: 
Plaintiff appeals from a Decree of Divorce 
which distributed property and debts between 
the parties, cancelled pre-marital note exec-
uted by defendant in favor of plaintiff, denied 
plaintiff alimony, and granted a divorce to 
both parties. -
The parties married in 1974 when plaintiff 
was 56 years old and defendant 63. Both had 
prior marriages. They separated in 1981 and 
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covered by Airport's insurance issued by 
Home was a genuine issue of material fact 
that precluded summary judgment. Utah R. 
Civ, P. 56(c). Airport's limited concession of 
liability does not cure this problem; it was not 
a concession that Christiansen accepted. At 
oral argument on the motions, Christiansen 
maintained that Holiday was covered by the 
Home policy. Absent a resolution of that 
issue, the court could not determine whether 
Airport was liable at all. For this reason, 
summary judgment on the issue of damages 
was improper. Therefore, we reverse the trial 
court's grant of Airport's motion for 
summary judgment. 
Christiansen also argues on appeal tfiat the 
district court should have granted her motion 
for summary judgment against Airport and 
Home for the full amount of the stipulated 
judgment. There is no merit to this position. 
The court properly decided that Home's lia-
bility could not be determined because Home 
had not been joined as a party and, therefore, 
would not be bound by such a judgment. 
And, as indicated previously, there was a 
genuine issue of material fact that precluded 
any determination of the liability of: either 
Home or Airport. ^ 
Christiansen - counters that the failure to 
bring Home into the action is not a basis for 
denying her a judgment for the full amount of 
the tort award. She reasons that under Utah 
law, a plaintiff must direct any action against 
the tort-feasor and may not name the tort-
feasor's insurer as a party to an action. Since 
she was precluded from naming Home, that 
fact cannot be used to deny her the full jud-
gment to which she is entitled. 
It is true that Home could not be a named 
party in Christiansen's original tort action 
against Holiday. Christensen v. Peterson, 25 
Utah 2d 411, 483 P.2d 447 (1971); Young v. 
Barney, 20 Utah 2d 108, 433 P.2d 846 (1967). 
But once she settled with Holiday and began 
pursuing Holiday's assigned rights, which 
included Holiday's claims against both 
Airport and Home, nothing precluded her 
from bringing Home into the action for a 
determination of "the coverage of its insurance 
policy and its liability for the tort judgment 
against Holiday. See Utah R. Civ. P. 20-21. 
However, as matters stand, due to plaintiffs 
failure to join Home, the issue of whether 
Holiday was covered by the Home insurance 
policy has yet to be resolved. We are therefore 
unmoved by Christiansen's argument and 
affirm the trial court's denial of her motion 
for a summary judgment. 
The judgment below is reversed in part and 
affirmed in part. 
WE CONCUR: 
Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice 
I. Daniel Stewart^ Associate Chief Justice ^ 
Richard C. Howe, Justice 
Christine M. Durham, Justice 
1. Christiansen asserts on appeal that Home's 
lawyer is actually conducting Airport's defense and 
that there has been collusion between Airport and 
Home in an attempt to deny Christiansen the bene-
fits of the insurance policy. Specifically, she argues 
that Home is attempting to limit its potential expo-
sure to $15,000 by having Airport admit that it 
breached its agreement and by agreeing to pay any judgment based on that breach. Although there may 
be substance to Christiansen's charges, that fact 
does not alter our conclusion. 
Cite as 
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OPINION 
ORME, Judge: 
The appellant seeks a reversal or readjust-
ment of the property division and alimony 
awarded to his former wife upon their divorce. 
His challenge focuses,on a $120,000 property 
settlement given to his ex-wife to reflect her 
interest in his medical degree. We affirm the 
trial court's basic disposition, but require 
amendment of the decree insofar as the 
$120,000 award is concerned. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
The parties were married in September 1963 
when they were, both entering their senior year 
of college. Both .graduated with Bachelor's 
degrees. Dr. Petersen continued his education 
and obtained a Master's degree, while Mrs. 
Petersen worked as an elementary school 
teacher to help finance her husband's educa-
tion. After receiving his Master's degree, Dr. 
Petersen entered medical school. During 
medical school, Dr. Petersen earned approxi-
mately $1,000 per year in injcome. The couple 
also took but a* student loan arid received 
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some money from Mrs. Petersen's parents. 
While her husband was in medical school, 
Mrs. Petersen worked one year on a M l time 
basis and three years part time. 
When Dr. Petersen began his internship, 
Mrs. Petersen stopped working to stay at 
home with their child. During the next fifteen 
years, Mrs. Petersen was not employed outside 
the home and her teaching certification 
expired. 
By the time of their divorce, the parties had 
been married twenty years and had six chil-
dren under the age of 18. The decree gave 
Mrs. Petersen custody of the six minor chil-
dren, the family residence subject to the first 
mortgage, most of the family furniture, and 
two automobiles. She was awarded $300 per 
month per child as child support, $.1,000 per 
month alimony, and the cash property settle-
ment of $120,000, which Dr. Petersen was to 
pay in installments of $1,000 per month 
without interest. 
Under the decree, Dr. Petersen received his 
professional corporation, the total interest in 
his pension and profit sharing plan, two con-
dominiums, a boat, an undivided one-
seventh interest in a cabin near Bear Lake, 
and other rental property. He also was given 
the right to claim all six children as depend-
ents for income tax purposes. 
The trial court explained the $120,000 cash 
settlement as follows: 
The Court believes that this case is 
classic, in that defendant is entitled 
to a property award reflecting an 
ownership interest of the defendant 
in plaintiffs medical degree. It is 
abundantly clear that defendant 
helped plaintiff earn that degree 
during their marriage, and that 
plaintiffs ability to earn is based 
upon that degree. Further, that 
following the earning of the degree 
and the entry into the medical pra-
ctice, by mutual agreement, defen-
dant undertook the raising and 
nurturing of the children as her 
responsibility to the marital partn-
ership, while plaintiff practiced 
medicine. It is difficult to find in 
the evidence presented any system 
for the measurement of the value of 
the degree, and the Court must 
therefore deal with the case mostly 
upon an alimony basis. To deal 
with the case fully upon an alimony 
basis is not fair to the defendant, 
inasmuch as any effort to restruc-
ture her life by seeking to better her 
employment opportunities or to re-
marry will operate against her 
alimony rights. Defendant is there-
fore awarded $1,000 per month 
permanent alimony and a lump sum 
property award in respect to the 
medical degree in the amount of 
$120,000, payable in installments of 
$1,000 per month from the date of 
the decree. 
On appeal, Dr. Petersen argues that the 
division of marital property was inequitable, 
particularly the $120,000 property settlement 
given to his wife. Dr. Petersen argues that it 
was error to characterize "his" medical degree 
as marital property and require him to cash 
out Mrs. Petersen's interest therein over a 10-
year period. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW AND 
PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS 
Generally, the trial court is permitted con-
siderable discretion in adjusting the financial 
and property interests of the parties to a 
divorce action ancj its determinations are ent-
itled to a presumption of validity. E.g., 
Burnham v. Burnhnm, 716 P.2d 781, 782 
(Utah 1986). And although appellate courts 
may weigh the evidence and substitute their 
judgment for that of the trial court in divorce 
actions, as the Supreme Court stated in Turner 
v. Turner, 649 ?.2d 6 (Utah 1%2), "this court 
will not do so lightly and merely because its 
judgment may differ from that of the trial 
judge, A trial court's apportionment of pro-
perty will not be disturbed unless it works 
such a manifest injustice or inequity as to 
indicate a clear abuse of discretion." 649 P.2d 
at 8. 
In the present case, the trial court approp-
riately attempted to equalize the parties' res-
pective standards of living. See Olson v. 
Olson, 704 P.2d 564, 566 (Utah 1985). Dr. 
Petersen was found capable of earning 
$100,000 per year while Mrs. Petersen's ability 
to obtain recertification and secure a teaching 
contract was found to be speculative at best. 
Even if she succeeded, she would earn only 
one-fourth to one-fifth of what Dr. Pete-
rsen would earn annually. The trial court 
spoke of the difficulty of measuring the value 
of Dr. Petersen's degree. The court chose to 
balance the inequalities between the parties 
partly with the alimony award. However, the 
trial court did not want Mrs. Petersen to lose 
all of her entitlement upon remarriage, so the 
trial court provided for an additional $120,000 
as a property award, payable in $1,000 
monthly installments. Characterization of 
these payments as a property award created 
the main issue for appeal. 
DEGREES AS PROPERTY 
The question of whether an advanced degree 
is a property interest subject to division upon 
divorce is one of first impression at the app-
ellate level in Utah.1 However, the majority of 
jurisdictions that have considered the issue 
have held that advanced degrees or professi-
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onal licenses are not property. Wisner v. 
Wisner, 129 Ariz. 333, 631 P.2d 115, 122 
(Ariz. App. 1981)(husband's medical license 
and board certificate are not property subject 
to division, but education is a factor to be 
considered in arriving at equitable property 
division, maintenance, and child support); In 
re Marriage of Aufmuth, 89 Cal. App.3d 446, 
152 Cah Rptr, 668, 677 (1979)(legal education | 
not a property right); In re Marriage of I 
Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75, 77 | 
(1978)(MBA degree not marital property I 
subject to division); In re Marriage of Hort-
sman, 263 N.W.2d 885, 891 (Iowa 1978)(law 
degree is not a distributable asset upon 
divorce; future earnings, are); Olah v. Olah, 
135 Mich. App. 404, 354 N.W.2d 359, 361 
(Mich App. 1984)(medical degree not property 
or marital asset); Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 I 
N.J. 488, 453 A.2d 527, 536 (1982)(courts may I 
not make any permanent distribution of the | 
value of professional degrees and licenses, j 
whether based on estimated worth or cost); 
Ruben v. Ruben, 461 A.2d 733, 735 (N.H. 
1983)(graduate degree acquired by one spouse 
during the marriage is not an asset subject to 
division upon divorce); Muckleroy v. Muckl-
eroy, 84 N.M. 14, 498 P.2d 1357, 1358 
(1972)(medical license is not community pro-
perty); Hubbard v. Hubbard, 603 P.2d 747, 
750-751 (Okl. 1979)(medical license not 
property but wife entitled to compensation for 
her investment).2 
These cases and others are consistent with 
our understanding of what "property" is and 
what an educational degree is. Property can be 
bought, sold, and devised. Bona fide degrees 
cannot be bought; they are earned. They 
cannot be sold; they are personal to the named 
recipient. Upon the death of the named reci-
pient, the certificate commemorating award of 
the degree might be passed along and treas-
ured as a family heirloom, but the recipient 
may not, on the strength of that degree, pra-
ctice law or medicine. In this case, the court 
awarded the parties' home to Mrs. Peterson. 
But it might have awarded the home to Dr. 
Petersen or it might have ordered the home 
sold and the net proceeds divided. The court 
had no such alternatives with the medical 
degree, precisely because the degree is not 
property. Consideration of some of the cases 
cited above and others supports our fundam-
ental conclusion and demonstrates the range 
of related problems. 
In Muckleroy v. Muckleroy, 84 N.M. 14, 
498 P.2d 1357 (1972), it had been argued that 
the husband's education was the product of 
the joint labor and industry of both parties, so 
that after their marriage it was community 
property. The New Mexico Supreme Court 
rejected this argument and concluded: 
A medical license is only a permit 
issued by the controlling authority 
of the State, authorizing the indiv-
idual licensee to engage in the pra-
ctice of medicine. The medical 
license may be used and enjoyed by 
the licensee as a means of earning a 
livelihood, but it is not community 
property because it cannot be the 
subject of joint ownership. 
84 N.M. at 15,498 P.2d at 1358. 
The same issue arose as to an M.B.A. 
degree earned by the husband in In re Marr-
iage of Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75 
(1978). Again, the concept of an advanced 
degree being property was rejected: 
An educational degree, such as an 
M.B.A., is simply not encompassed 
even by the broad views of the 
concept of "property/ It does not 
have an exchange value or any . 
objective transferable value on an 
open market. It is personal to the 
holder. It terminates on death of 
the holder and is not inheritable. It 
cannot be assigned, sold, transfe-
rred, conveyed, or pledged. An 
advanced degree is a cumulative 
product of many years of previous 
education, combined with diligence 
and hard work. It may not be acq-
uired by the mere expenditure of 
money. It is simply an intellectual 
achievement that may potentially 
assist in* the future acquisition of 
property. In our view, it has none 
of the attributes of property in the 
usual sense of that term. 
194 Colo, at 432; 574 P.2d at 77. 
The wife in Graham had worked full time 
throughout the couple's six-year marriage, 
and had contributed 70 percent of the family 
income in addition, to most of the household 
work while her husband was acquiring his 
degree. The trial court found that the degree 
was jointly owned property and had determ-
ined that the future earning value of the 
M.B.A. degree to Mr. Graham was 
$82,836.00. Mrs. Graham was awarded 
$33,134.00 of that amount. On appeal, the 
state supreme court affirmed the reversal of 
the trial court by the court of appeals. 574 
P.2d at 76. The fact that the decision left Mrs. 
Graham with nothing to show for her six years 
of labor prompted a three judge dissent which 
strongly urged that the husband's increased 
earning power represented by the degree 
should be considered marital property, where 
there was no accumulated property and the 
spouse who subsidized the degree was inelig-
ible for maintenance.3 574 P.2d at 78-79. 
The equitable concerns addressed in the 
Graham dissent are reflected in the few cases 
that have found an advanced degree or prof-
essional license to be marital property. 
In Daniels v. Daniels, 185 N.E.2d 773 (Ohio 
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1961), the court held that the right to practice 
medicine was in the nature of a franchise and 
constituted property which the trial court had 
a right to consider in making an award of 
alimony. In Daniels, the parties to the action 
were married while students at a university. 
During the time of their marriage the wife 
received her degree in business administration 
and the husband received a degree in medicine 
one year later. Each contributed toward his or 
her own maintenance and education, the 
balance in financial support for the family 
coming from the wife's father, who contrib-
uted sizable sums to the marriage. At the time 
of their divorce, neither party had much in the 
way of tangible assets. The court awarded 
$24,000 in lump sum alimony, but did not 
actually divide the value of the medical degree. 
185N.E.2dat776. 
Recently, in O'Brien v. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d 
576, 489 N.E.2d 712, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743 
(1985), the New York Court of Appeals affi-
rmed the trial court's holding that a license to 
practice medicine acquired during the marriage 
is marital property subject to division. In 
O'Brien, the wife was held entitled to a 40 
percent interest in her husband's medical 
license. The wife had contributed approxima-
tely 76 percent of the couples' total income 
while the husband obtained his license. The 
breakdown of the marriage occurred shortly 
after the husband completed his schooling, 
and the only tangible asset existing after their 
nine-year marriage was the husband's 
medical license, 
The New York court distinguished its anal-
ysis in O'Brien from that of other jurisdict-
ions which have found a license or advanced 
degree not to be marital property. As the 
O'Brien court explained: 
Plaintiff does not contend that his 
license is excluded from distribution 
because it is separate property; 
rather, he claims that it is not pro-
perty at all but represents a pers-
onal attainment in acquiring kno-
wledge. He rests his argument on 
decisions in similar cases from other 
jurisdictions and on his view that a 
license does not satisfy common-
law concepts of property. Neither 
contention is controlling because 
decisions in other States rely prin-
cipally on their own statutes, and 
the legislative history underlying 
them, and because the New York 
Legislature deliberately went beyond 
traditional property concepts when 
it formulated the Equitable Distri-
bution Law. 
66 N.Y,2d at 583, 489 N.E.2d at 715, 498 
N.Y.S.2d at 746. New York's highest court 
acknowledged in O'Brien that their statute 
creates a new species of property, previously 
unknown at common law or under prior sta-
tutes. 66 N.Y.2d at 586, 489 N.E.2d at 719, 
498 N.YS.2d at 748. Critical portions of the 
New York Equitable Distribution Law provide 
that in making an equitable distribution of 
marital property, the court shall consider the 
efforts one spouse made to the other spouse's 
career or career potential and the difficulty of 
evaluating an interest in a profession. 66 
N.Y.2d at 584, 489 N.E.2d at 715-716, 498 
N.Y.S.2d at 746-47. Thus, the analysis in 
O'Brien, although illustrative of the equitable 
concerns for the working spouse who supports 
I the other through an advanced degree, 66 
N.Y.2d at 585-588, 489 N.E.2d at 716-718, 
498 N.Y.S.2d at 746-48, is limited in appli-
cation because of the pivotal role of the 
unusual and expansive distribution statute 
enacted in New York. 
We agree with the majority opinion in 
Graham that an advanced degree is or confers 
an intangible right which, because of its cha-
racter, cannot properly be characterized as 
property subject to division between the 
spouses. No special statute, as in New York, 
permits us to treat the degree as though it 
were property. On the other hand, criteria for 
an award of support in Utah are not so rigid 
as in Colorado, preventing the harsh result of 
Graham. In this state, traditional alimony 
analysis is the appropriate and adequate 
I method for making adjustments between the 
parties in cases of this type.4 
AWARD IN TfflS CASE 
| As indicated, the trial court was in error 
| when it awarded Mrs. Petersen the $120,000 
cash settlement to reflect her share of the 
value of her husband's medical degree. Non-
I etheless, the court's basic disposition was fair 
and can be sustained if the $1,000 monthly 
payments which Dr. Petersen was to make in 
satisfaction of that obligation are recharacte-
rized as additional alimony, a result which is 
readily supported by the trial court's findings. 
! In reviewing the court's findings, we find 
ample evidence to affirm the property division 
aside from the $120,000 cash settlement. As 
the Supreme Court stated in Fletcher v. Flet-
cher, 615 P.2d 1218 (Utah 1980), "[t]here is no 
; fixed formula upon which to determine a 
: division of properties, it is a prerogative of the 
I court to make whatever disposition of prop-
I erty as it deems fair, equitable, and necessary 
I for the protection and welfare of the parties/ 
i 615 P.2d at 1222. Although Dr. Petersen was 
awarded a smaller percentage of the marital 
assets, he received all but one of the income 
j producing assets: his professional corporation, 
I his pension and profit sharing plan, two con-
dominiums, and other business interests. The 
I parties were to share evenly in a $10,000 inv-
j estment corporation. We find the basic prop-
I erty division equitable. ' 
: As for the cash settlement payable in 
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monthly installments of $1,000, it is properly 
affirmed as alimony, making Mrs. Petersen's 
entire alimony award $2,000 per month. Cri-
teria considered in determining a reasonable 
award of support must include the financial 
conditions and needs of the spouse in need of 
support, the ability of that spouse to produce 
sufficient income for his or her own support, 
and the ability of the other spouse to provide 
support. Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 
ftJtah.1985). 
In this case, then, the first factor to be 
considered is the financial condition and needs 
of Mrs. Petersen. For over ten years, Mrs. 
Petersen and her family enjoyed a very com-
fortable lifestyle. She now must make mort-
gage payments on the home and pay for the 
ordinary expenses of food, clothing and tra-
nsportation. Other than the one-half interest 
in the investment corporation, Mrs. Petersen 
was awarded none of the income-producing 
assets. She has no outside income. 
The second factor to be considered is Mrs. 
Petersen's ability to produce a sufficient 
income for herself. Although Mrs. Petersen is 
a college graduate with a Bachelor's degree 
and is trained as a school teacher, she is not 
currently certified. She would require additi-
onal training to become certified and, even if 
certified, her ability to produce income would 
be one fourth to one fifth of what Dr. Pete-
rsen's income has provided the family. The 
trial court found that the chance of her being 
able to secure a teaching contract was 
''speculative." During most of the marriage, 
Mrs. Petersen was not employed outside the 
home. She stopped working, primarily at the 
urging of her husband, and devoted her time 
to raising their six children. It is unreasonable 
to assume that she will be able immediately to 
enter the job market and support herself in the 
style in which she had been living before the 
divorce. See Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 
1075 (Utah 1985). 
The final factor to be considered is the* 
ability of Dr. Petersen to provide support. 
This is the proper realm in which to consider 
advanced degrees or professional licenses. An 
advanced degree is ordinarily an indicator of 
potential future earnings. In addition,-the 
attainment of a degree by one spouse often 
results in a disparity of income that is likely to 
last for a great time, particularly in cases like" 
the present one. Dr. Petersen has a history of 
earning more than $100,000 a year and Mrs. 
Petersen has not worked for the past fifteen. 
But it is the discrepancy in their earning power 
which is the basis for alimony; not the discr-
epancy in their educations. There is no logical 
reason, for example, for treating differently a 
self-trained artist without formal education 
who earns and will earn $100,000 a year and a 
doctor with a medical degree who earns and 
will earn $100,000 a year. Other things being 
equal, if such an artist divorces his or her 
spouse, he or she should pay alimony comp-
arable to that paid by such a doctor. Whether 
a spouse's ability to provide support is the 
result of an advanced degree or professional 
license is irrelevant to the analysis. The key is 
the spouse's ability. 
In Savage v. Savage, 658 P.2d 1201 (Utah 
1983), the Supreme Court explained: 
Where a marriage is of long dura-
tion and the earning capacity of one 
spouse greatly exceeds that of the 
other, as here, it is appropriate to 
order alimony and child support at 
a level which will insure that the 
supported spouse and children may 
maintain a standard of living not 
unduly. disproportionate to that 
which they would have enjoyed had 
the marriage continued. 
658 P.2d at 1205. See Jeppson v. Jeppson, 684 
P.2d 69 (Utah 1984). 
In Savage, the parties had enjoyed a high 
standard of living during the marriage and the 
court upheld an award of $2,000 per month 
alimony and child support of $500 per month 
per child. 658 P.2d at 1205. In Yelderman v. 
Yelderman, 669 P.2d 407 (Utah 1983), the 
Supreme Court upheld an alimony award of 
$2,500 per month as not excessive. 669 P.2d at 
409. We agree that $2,000 per month alimony 
to Mrs. Petersen is sufficient to help her 
maintain a standard of living not unduly dis-
proportionate to that which she would have 
enjoyed if the marriage had continued.5 
Accordingly, this case is remanded to Dist-
rict Court to amend the decree to provide that 
Mrs. Petersen receive $2,000 per month 
alimony and, correspondingly, to delete the 
$120,000 cash award. The decree is otherwise 
affirmed. Each party shall bear his or her own 
costs of appeal. 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
1. In Dogu v. Dogu, 652 P.2d 1308 (Utah 1982), the 
Utah Supreme Court dealt with the valuation of a 
professional corporation. In Dogu, the husband was 
awarded his professional corporation, and his wife 
was awarded property to offset its value. 652 P.2d 
at 1309. Although the proper characterization of a 
medical degree, as Jn the present case, and the val-
uation of a professional medical corporation, as in 
Dogu, may involve related questions, the legal issues 
regarding the two are distinct. 
In Tremayne v. Tremayne, 116 Utah 483, 211 
P.2d 452 (1949), the Supreme Court upheld the trial 
court's property division and award of alimony to 
the wife, referring to the wife's working to help her 
husband through school; the fact that, with the 
divorce, the wife was deprived of the benefits of his 
increased earnings; and the discrepancy in their 
earning capacities. Tremayne does not address the 
issue of whether an advanced degree or license is 
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marital property. 
2. The question of whether an advanced degree or 
professional license is marital property subject to 
division upon divorce has attracted considerable 
attention from legal scholars. For one of the better 
reasoned discussions, see Note, Property Distribu-
tion in Domestic Relations Law: A Proposal for 
Excluding Educational Degrees and Professional 
Licenses from the Marital Estate, 11 Hofstra L. 
Rev. 1327(1983). 
3. In Graham, the wife did not request alimony 
because a Colorado statute, Colo. Rev. Stat. §14-
10-114 (1973), restricted the court's power to 
award maintenance to cases where the spouse 
seeking it was unable to support himself or herself. 
574P.2dat79. 
4. In cases like the instant one, life patterns have 
largely been set, the earning potential of both 
parties can be predicted with some reliability, and 
the contributions and sacrifices of the one spouse in 
enabling the other to attain a degree have been 
compensated by many years of the comfortable lif-
estyle which the degree permitted. Traditional 
alimony analysis works nicely to assure equity in 
such cases. 
In another kind of recurring case, typified by 
Graham, where divorce occurs shortly after the 
degree is obtained, traditional alimony analysis 
would often work hardship because, while both 
spouses have modest incomes at the time of divorce, 
the one is on the threshhoid of a significant increase 
in earnings. Moreover, the spouse who sacrificed so 
the other could attain a degree is precluded from 
enjoying the anticipated dividends the degree will 
ordinarily provide. Nonetheless, such a spouse is 
typically not remote in time from his or her previous 
education and is otherwise better able to adjust and 
to acquire comptuable skills, given the opportunity 
and the funding. In such cases, alimony analysis 
must become more creative to achieve fairness, and 
an award of "rehabilitative" or "reimbursement" 
alimony, net terminable upon remarriage, may be 
appropriate. See, e.g., Haugan v. Haugan, 117 Wis. 
2d 200, 343 N.W.2d 796 (1984); Mahoney v. 
Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488, 453 A.2d 527 (1982). 
i>. It is clear the court viewed the payments to Mrs. 
Petersen, both those it specifically called alimony 
and the additional $1,000 monthly payments, as 
appropriate for her support. It utilized the 
"property" label in characterizing some of the 
monthly totai as a means to preclude termination of 
the payments to Mrs. Petersen upon her remarriage. 
Although the court provided that the $1,000 per 
month payments not called alimony would terminate 
in ten years, nothing in the court's findings establ-
ishes any particular significance to that point in 
time. We accordingly see no basis, now that the 
entire monthly payment is properly characterized as 
alimony, to require that half of the $2,000 monthly 
total automatically and arbitrarily terminate at the 
end of ten years. Cf. Olson v. Olson, 704 P.2d 564, 
567 (Utah 1985) (court modified divorce decree to 
delete provision that alimony would terminate after 
two years where monthly amount was reasonable 
but two-year limit was not). Of course, it would be 
proper for the district court to readjust the amount 
of alimony awarded to Mrs. Petersen if at any point 
in time there develops a material change of circum-
stances, such as Mrs. Petersen securing gainful 
employment or if Dr. Petersen's salary drops dra-
matically through no fault> of his own. See, e.g., 
Naylor v. Naylor, 700 P.2d 707, 710 (Utah 1985); 
Haslam v. Haslam, 657 P.2d 757, 758 (Utah 1982). 
The district court retains continuing jurisdiction in 
divorce actions to amend alimony. Utah Code Ann. 
§30-3-5 (1986). In addition, the alimony 
awarded to Mrs. Petersen automatically terminates 
under certain circumstances. Id. 
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OPINION 
BILLINGS, Judge: 
Defendant appeals from the trial court's 
entry nunc pro tunc of an order distributing 
property incident to a previously granted 
divorce. We reverse the district court. 
The parties were divorced on January 27, 
1984. The divorce action was bifurcated with 
the four day property division trial to begin on 
June 19, 1984./On the second day of the trial, 
June 20, 1984, the parties entered into an oral 
property settlement agreement on the record. 
The record reflects the property was to be 
transferred in order "to equalize the marital 
assets of the parties." 
The court approved the agreement and 
requested plaintiffs counsel to prepare an 
order reflecting the oral stipulation. Defen-
dant's counsel objected to the prepared order 
as it did not indicate the transfer was to 
"equalize the marital assets,* language which 
was determinative as to the tax consequences 
of the agreement. The court therefore set a 
hearing on August 8, 1984 to consider the 
dispute over the tax language. 
The dispute oyer the terms of the agreement 
is best understood with reference to federal tax 
law. Prior to July 18; 1984, taxation of 
marital property settlements depended on the 
terms of the court's order or the parties' 
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questions actually asked, we cannot determine 
if the trial judge's questions denied plaintiff 
the information necessary to challenge biased 
jurors for cause. 
II 
Mr. King assigns as error the trial court's 
dismissal of his claim against defendant for 
loss of consortium. The trial court dismissed 
this claim, holding that Mr. King had failed to 
state a cause of action. Our recent decision in 
Hackford v. Utah Power & Light, No. 20208 
(Utah, June 9, 1987), disposes of this issue. 
The trial court properly dismissed Mr. King's 
claim. 
We affirm. 
WE CONCUR: 
Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice 
•Richard C. Howe, Justice 
Michael D. Zimmerman, Justice 
Stewart, Associate Chief Justice, 
concurs in the result. 
1. Plaintiff has also challenged the jury verdict 
finding her one hundred percent negligent. In view 
of our holding on the judgment not withstanding 
the verdict issue, we do not reach this portion of the 
jury's verdict. 
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OPINION 
ORME, Judge: 
In this divorce action, defendant Robert L.. 
Rayburn appeals the valuation and distribu-
tion of a retirement plan and an award of a 
$45,000 property. settlement to offset his 
medical degree. We affirm the trial court's 
basic disposition, but, require amendment of 
the decree insofar as the $45.000 award is 
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concerned. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Plaintiff Catherine Rayburn and Dr. 
Rayburn were married in Florida on June 20, 
1972. Earlier that same day, Dr. Rayburn had 
obtained his medical degree from the Univer-
sity of Florida. At the time, Mrs. Rayburn 
had a masters degree in zoology and was 
employed as a research associate at the Univ-
ersity of Florida. The couple moved to 
Houston, Texas where Dr. Rayburn completed 
a one year internship at Baylor University. Dr. 
Rayburn earned $8,000 to $9,000 during the 
internship. Mrs. Rayburn also worked during 
that year, earning approximately $7,200. The 
couple returned to Florida where Dr. Rayburn 
completed a three year residency, earning 
approximately $11,000 to $13,500 per year, 
Mrs. Rayburn worked for a short time in 
Florida, but upon the birth of their first child, 
she stopped working full-time and worked 
only occassionally, and on a part-time basis, 
throughout the rest of the marriage. 
After the residency, the family moved to 
San Antonio, where Dr. Rayburn completed 
two years of military service. During the five-
year period of the internship, the residency, 
and his military service, Dr. Rayburn acted as 
the primary financial provider for the family. 
Mrs. Rayburn stayed at home, for the most 
part, to raise their eventual three children. 
After military service, the family moved to 
Salt Lake City where Dr. Rayburn joined the 
staff of the Primary Children's Medical 
Center as a pediatric-anesthesiologist. In 
October 1982, Mrs. Rayburn filed for a 
divorce. 
Trial was held on July 18 and 19, 1983. At 
the time of trial, Dr. Rayburn was earning 
approximately $125,000 a year. After the two 
day trial, the court issued a memorandum 
decision. In the decision, the court determined 
to award custody of the three minor children, 
ages 9, 5, and 2, to Mrs. Rayburn and to 
order Dr. Rayburn to pay child support in the 
amount of $400 per child per month. Appar-
e n t ^ overlooking the exact sequence of events 
on the Rayburns' wedding day, the court 
found the husband's medical degree to be a 
marital assset and ordered Dr. Rayburn to pay 
Mrs. Rayburn $45,000, payable at $750 a 
month, as her share of the asset and to 
"maintain her lifestyle for a period of adjust-
ment." The decision would have awarded Dr. 
Rayburn all of his retirement fund. 
About two weeks later, the court issued a 
supplemental decision in which the court 
altered its earlier decision on the retirement 
plan. The court, "in order to make a more 
equitable division of property," ordered Dr. 
Rayburn to pay one-half the net present 
value of the retirement plan, $56,850, to Mrs^ 
Rayburn in fiwe annual installments of $11,370 
plus interest. The court entered Findings of. 
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Fact, Conclusions of Law, and a decree on 
September 15, 1983. The decree expressly 
awarded no alimony and set December 15, 
1983, as the effective date of the divorce. 
Dr. Rayburn promptly filed a motion for 
relief from judgment or for a new trial. Dr. 
Rayburn claimed the trial court failed to 
consider the drastic tax consequences of 
placing a present value on the retirement plan 
and awarding half of that to his wife. The 
court took Dr. Rayburn's motion under adv-
isement. On December 9, 1983, the court 
issued another memorandum decision. This 
decision provided for amendment of the 
decree in such terms as would permit the five 
retirement plan payments to be treated as 
alimony for tax purposes. The court entered a 
second set of findings, conclusions, and decree 
on February 28, 1984. The second decree 
again awarded no alimony as such, made the 
embellishment for tax purposes, and set Feb-
ruary 28 as the effective date of the divorce. 
Dr. Rayburn retained new counsel, who filed a 
motion for relief from the new judgment or a 
new trial. The court denied the motion and 
Dr. Rayburn appealed. 
On appeal,.Dr. Rayburn claims the court 
erroneously placed a high value on the retire-
ment plan without considering the tax conse-
quences. Dr. Rayburn also claims the court 
erred in finding the medical degree to be a 
marital asset and placing a value on it without 
any supporting evidence. 
RECORD ON APPEAL 
Dr. Rayburn ordered a transcript on appeal 
of only 30 pages, representing a tiny fraction 
of the testimony offered at trial. Under Rule 
11(e)(2) of the Rules of the Utah Court of 
Appeals and the predecessor Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, "If the appellant intends 
to urge on appeal that a finding or conclusion 
is unsupported by or is contrary to the evid-
ence, the appellant shall include-in the record 
a transcript of all evidence relevant to such 
finding or conclusion." Since the transcript 
provided by the appellant is insufficient to 
allow a review of the evidence to determine 
the propriety of the findings, this court 
accepts the trial court's Findings of Fact as 
true1 and only evaluates the legal correctness 
of the two disputed dispositions.2 As indic-
ated, the disputes concern the $45,000 prop-
erty settlement reflecting Mrs. Ray burn's 
"share" of her husband's medical degree and 
the payments for Mrs. Rayburn's one-half 
interest in the present value of the doctor's 
retirement plan.3 
THE MEDICAL DEGREE 
Recently this court held that an advanced 
degree or professional license is not marital 
property subject to division upon divorce. 
Petersen v. Petersen, 58 Utah Adv. Rep. 28 
(Utah App. May 18, 1987). However, an 
advanced degree often accompanies a disparity 
in earning potential that is appropriately 
considered as a factor in alimony analysis. See 
/d., at 32. We reaffirm our holding in Petersen 
and analyze the instant appeal under the same 
analysis employed in that case. ^ 
The cash settlement of $45,000 payable in | 
monthly installments of $750 cannot be sust- j 
ained under Petersen as a property settlement, J 
but payments of $750 per month for a 5-year \ 
period are properly affirmed as alimony.4 1 
Criteria considered in determining a reason- \ 
able award of support must include the fina- \ 
ncial conditions and needs of the spouse in 1 
need of support, the ability of that spouse to | 
produce sufficient income for his or her own 
support, and the ability of the other spouse to J 
provide support. Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d I 
1072, 1075 (Utah 1985). See Paffel v. Paffel, l 
732 P.2d 96, 100-101 (Utah 1986)(failure to J 
consider these three factors constitutes an | 
abuse of discretion). Although characterizing J 
the monthly payments as a property settle-
ment, the trial court expressly found factors 
that readily meet the criteria listed in Jones. 
As for Mrs. Rayburn's need for support 
and her ability to produce sufficient income, 
the trial court found that Mrs. Rayburn was 
presently unemployed, but that she had been 
employed and was well-educated, having 
acquired bachelor's and master's degrees. 
However, with minor children residing at 
home and not yet in school, Mrs. Rayburn 
was reluctant to return immediately to the full-
time workforce. In addition, the court acce-
pted Mrs. Rayburn's testimony that in order 
to bring her employment skills to a satisfac-
tory level, she needed to return to school and 
obtain further education "to complement her 
current education."5 As for Dr. Rayburn's 
ability to provide support, the trial court 
found that Dr. Rayburn was well-educated, 
having obtained an M.D. degree, and that he 
had a successful practice as a pediatric-
anesthesiologist. earning a projected $125,000 
for 1983. 
In its first memorandum decision, the trial 
court characterized the monthly payments for 
Mrs. Rayburn as necessary "to maintain her 
life style for a period of adjustment." The 5-
year period corresponded to the amount of 
time it would take for Mrs. Rayburn to com-
plete her additional education on a part-time 
basis and until the parties' youngest child was 
in school ail day.6 
We acknowledge that there will be situations 
where an award of non-terminable rehabili-
tative or reimbursement alimony would be 
appropriate. See Petersen v. Petersen, 58 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 33. However, this is not such a 
case. Dr. Rayburn acquired his medical degree 
before the parties were married. Although 
Mrs. Rayburn worked periodically during the 
marriage, she did not endure substantial fin-
ancial sacrifices or defer her own education to 
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help him obtain the degree. In addition, Mrs. 
Rayburn shared the financial rewards permi-
tted by her husband's advanced degree for 
several years. Those rewards also resulted in 
the accumulation of considerable real and 
personal property during their marriage, which 
was equitably divided upon their divorce. The 
award of temporary alimony, at $750 per 
month for a maximum of five years,7 adequ-
ately meets Mrs. Rayburn's support needs and 
is readily sustainable under the criteria outl-
ined in Jones. 
THE RETIREMENT PLAN 
Dr. Rayburn's retirement fund was one of 
the valuable assets accumulated during the 
marriage and was of course subject to equit-
able division upon divorce. Woodward v. 
Woodward, 656 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1982). See 
EnglUt v. Englert, 576 P.2d 1274, 1276 
(Utah 1978). We accept the trial court's 
finding that the retirement fund's present 
value was $113,700. In its second memora-
ndum.decision, the trial court explained that it 
had considered several ways to distribute the 
wife's share of the retirement fund and found 
fixing a sum equal to one-half of the present 
value ami distributing that to Mrs. Rayburn as 
a cash award to be the most equitable. By 
requiring. Mrs* Rayburn's share in the retire-
ment fund to be cashed out following divorce, 
the court avoided leaving the parties in a 
"financial entanglement that would continue 
for approximately twenty or thirty years and 
would probably result in further court hear-
ings and cause future animosity between the 
parties." 
However, the court went on to explain that 
"to require the defendant to pay the full sum 
at one time would have been an extra 
burden." By allowing Dr. Rayburn to make 
five annual payments, the court left him the 
option of paying his obligation out of current 
income or on some other basis, rather than 
having to liquidate the fund or sell other 
assets. The court additionally softened the 
impact by ultimately allowing the payments to 
be characterized in such terms as would permit 
them to be treated as "alimony" for tax pur-
poses.8 
There is admittedly some potential for 
confusion because of the measures taken by 
the trial court to massage the tax treatment of 
the payments to Mrs. Rayburn. However, 
these measures were the trial court's response 
to Dr. Rayburn's very own argument that the 
payments worked a financial hardship on him. 
The trial court allowed the payments to be 
considered "alimony" for tax'purposes in 
order to give Dr. Rayburn the tax break of the 
alimony deduction while at the same time 
permitting Mrs. Rayburn to be cashed out 
within a few years; On appellate review, the 
trial court's apportionment of property will 
not be disturbed unless it works such a mani-
For comoiete Utah Code Annotations. 
rest injustice or inequity as to indicate a clear 
abuse of discretion. E.g., Turner v. Turner, 
649 P.2d 6, 8 (Utah 1982). We find no abuse 
of discretion in the court's awarding Mrs. 
Rayburn a one half interest in the retirement 
fund, payable over five years with interest. On 
the contrary, and especially with the refinem-
ents which were made to address Dr. 
Rayburn's concerns about- taxes, the trial 
court's approach was clearly fair and equit-
able. 
Accordingly, this case is remanded to the 
district court to amend the decree to provide 
that Mrs. Rayburn receive $750 per month 
alimony for five years and, correspondingly, 
to delete the $45,000 cash award. The decree is 
otherwise affirmed. Each party shall bear his 
or her own costs of appeal. 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
1. See Sawyers v. Sawyers, 558 P.2d 607, 608 (Utah 
1976) ('Appellate review of factual matters can be 
meaningful, orderly, and intelligent only in juxtap-
osition to a record by which lower courts' ruling 
and decisions on disputes can be measured."). In 
Sawyers, the Supreme Court presumed the findings 
of the trial court to have been supported by admis-
sible, competent, substantial evidence. Id. See Mit-
chell v. Mitchell, 527 P.2d 1359, 1360-61 (Utah 
1974). 
2. At oral argument, Dr. Rayburn advised he did 
not really intend to question the findings in view of 
the evidence, only the propriety of the disposition in 
view of the findings. 
3. On appeal, Dr. Rayburn also argues that the trial 
court erred in filing two separate Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law and two separate decrees 
with different effective dates. In this regard he relies 
heavily on the failure of the second batch of docu-
ments to employ the term "amended/ contending 
confusion will result about which decree controls. 
The second set of findings, conclusions, and decree 
was of course prompted by pr. Rayburn's motion 
for relief from judgment. Although not expressly 
labeled as "amended," the second set of findings, 
conclusions, and decree clearly supercedes the first 
set and are the direct subject of this appeal. 
4. The trial court quite clearly viewed those paym-
ents as necessary for support but utilized the prop-
erty settlement label as a means to preclude their 
termination should Mrs. Rayburn remarry. While it 
is true that with alimony the receiving spouse may 
lose some of his or her award through certain 
changed circumstances, like remarriage, Utah Code 
Ann. §30-3-5 (1986), it is noted that with inst-
allments on a property award, the receiving spouse 
might lose some of the award if the paying spouse 
obtained a discharge in bankruptcy. By contrast, an 
alimony obligation would survive bankruptcy. 11 
U.S.C.A. §523 (a)(5) (West Supp. 1987). Charact-
erization of required future payments as hi satisfa-
ction of a marital property disposition, rather than 
as alimony, is not always in the best interest of the 
receiving' spouse. Cf. Beckmann v. Beckmann, 685 
P .2d 1045, 1050 (Utah 1984) (The fact that an inst-
consult Code A Cn's Annotation Service 
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rument is labeled "property settlement agreement" 
does not necessarily determine whether debt is dis-
chargeable. Court will look at underlying nature of 
the debt, including whether spouse would be inade-
quately supported without the "property settle-
ment."). 
5. This additional education was apparently in the 
field of computer science. No doubt computeriza-
tion has mushroomed in importance in zoology, as 
in nearly every area of scientific endeavor, during 
the decade Mrs. Rayburn was unemployed. Comp-
uter literacy would greatly enhance Mrs. Raybum's 
ability to obtain suitable employment. 
6 This rational basis for limiting the payments to a 
five-year period of adjustment distinguishes the 
case from Petersen, where we declined to implement 
a ten-year cap on alimony otherwise payable where 
there was no articulated basis for automatically 
diminishing the award upon the elapse of ten years. 
See Petersen v. Petersen, 58 Utah Adv, Rep. 33. See 
also Olson v. Olson, 704 P.2d 564, 567 (Utah 1985). 
7. The alimony obligation could terminate earlier 
under certain circumstances. Utah Code Ann. §30-
3-5 (1986). In addition, the district court has 
' "continuing jurisdiction" to change the alimony 
award "as is reasonable and necessary," id. (3), 
provided there develops a substantial change in the 
parties' circumstances. See, e.g., Naylor v. Naylor, 
700 P.2d 707, 710 (Utah 1985). 
8. The trial court did not stop here in tailoring the 
provision to make it as painless to Dr, Rayburn as 
possible under the circumstances. The Court stated 
in its Conclusions of Law: "In the event that the 
payments under this paragraph do not qualify as 
'alimony' for tax purposes, this would constitute a 
change of circumstances entitling the defendant to 
come back before the Court and obtain a modific-
ation reducing this payment to the extent of the 
income tax which he is required to pay because of 
an inability to take a deduction of these payments as 
'alimony'." 
FOURTH DISTRICT 
Hon. J. Robert Bullock 
ATTORNEYS: 
Richard B. Johnson for Appellant. 
John B. Maycock for Respondents. 
OPINION 
GARFF, Judge: 
In March, 1980, Lewis and Betty Berry were 
divorced. The trial court awarded appellant 
Betty, one-half of respondent Lewis' one-
third partnership interest in Berry Brothers' 
Farms, a family partnership operated as such 
since 1957. The court valued this one-half 
portion of the partnership interest at $42,000, 
and allowed Lewis, at his option, to repurc-
hase that interest in monthly payments over 
ten years at 12 percent interest. Shortly after 
the divorce decree was entered, Betty moved 
for an amended decree, which was entered on 
May 20, 1980. It granted Betty a money jud-
gment of $42,000 for one-half of the one-
third interest in Berry Brother's Farms, with 
an option to Lewis to pay this amount over a 
ten year period at 12 percent interest. In Berry 
v. Berry, 635 P.2d 68, 70 (Utah 1981), the 
Supreme Court reversed this amended decree, 
holding that because of the defendant's fina-
ncial condition, "it is inequitable to award the 
plaintiff a judgment against the defendant for 
the value of the fractional partnership interest 
awarded to her, and that it is also inequitable 
to require him to purchase her interest on the 
terms imposed by the trial court/' 
The Supreme Court also stated: 
Plaintiff suggests that the judgment 
and order of purchase imposed on 
the defendant should not create a 
hardship because he may be able to 
persuade the other partners to sever 
the real property of the partnership 
which consists of approximately 
1100 acres of land, and sell the 
severed portion to satisfy the plai-
ntiff's interest. We commend that 
suggestion to the defendant but 
cannot impose it upon him as an 
obligation inasmuch as under our 
partnership laws, §48-l-22(2)(b) 
and (c), U.C.A. 1953, neither plai-
fntiff nor defendant can force a sale 
of specific partnership property. 
/d.at70. 
Betty attempted, a second time, to force 
liquidation in August, 1981, when she moved 
to modify the decree, requesting the court to 
award a money judgment in the property of 
the family partnership or liquidate the partn-
ership assets of the defendant's one-third 
interest. The trial court found no change of 
circumstances and refused to liquidate the 
partnership assets or enter a money judgment. 
Betty brought this third independent action 
in July 1983, against Lewis, his partners 
Wallace and Rial Berry, and their, partnership, 
Berry Brothers' Farms. The action was 
brought to enforce the divorce decree in which 
Cite as 
59 Utah Adv. Rep. 45 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Betty Verdell BERRY, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Lewis Dale BERRY, Wallace Berry, and Rial 
Berry, dba Berry Brother's Farms, a 
partnership, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Before Judges Garff, Jackson and Billings. 
No. 860014-CA 
FILED: June 8, 1987 
For complete Utah Code Annotations, consult CodetCo's Annotation Service 
C o d e * C o 
Provo, Utah 61 UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS 31 
native, to remand the matter with instructions 
to the trial court to enter specific findings of j 
fact. ! 
The Utah Supreme Court decision in Jones 
v. Jones, 700 P.2d .1072 (Utah 1985), which 
was followed by this Court in Boyle v. Boyle, 
735 P.2d 669 (Utah App. 1987), is controlling 
in the instant case. In Jones, the findings of 
the trial court merely described the property 
awarded to each party and failed to assign any 
specific or cumulative values. The Utah 
Supreme Court held although the trial court 
has a broad latitude of discretion in orders 
concerning property distribution, "the trial 
court must exercise its discretion in accordance 
with the standards that have been set by this 
Court." Jones, 700 P.2d at 1074. One of those 
standards is the "findings of fact must include 
valuation of assets in order to permit appellate 
review." Boyle, 735 P.2d at 671. 
The Jones Court attempted to compensate 
for the lack of findings by reviewing the 
record for evidence of the values. However, 
the Court noted such "examination reveals 
that the valuation of the most important assets 
was hotly disputed by the parties. If the trial 
court accepted one set of values, the wife was 
clearly awarded too little; if another set was 
adopted, it is possible that the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion." Jones, 700 P.2d at 
1074. 
In Jones and Boyle, the Utah Supreme 
Court and this Court both ruled that despite 
the requirement of specific findings, the app-
ellants in both cases waived their claims since 
they were the parties who prepared the orig-
inal findings. Failing to prepare the findings to 
include values, they therefore waived challe-
nges on appeal. In the instant case, respondent 
plaintiff, not appellant defendant, prepared 
the findings. Therefore, the Jones exception 
does not apply. 
In the instant case, as in Jones, the valua-
tion of the most important assets is hotly 
disputed. If the trial court accepted one set of 
values, defendant was clearly awarded too 
little; if another set was adopted, the division 
could be equitable. Without specific findings 
of the values, we are unable to determine 
whether the trial court distributed the property 
equitably. We therefore remand for findings 
on the specific values of the assets. 
On remand, one of the key assets to be 
valued is Diana, Inc., the family business 
awarded to defendant. At trial, both parties 
testified the amount of money earned by and 
deposited into the account of Diana, Inc. 
during 1983 was approximately $750,000.00 to 
$1,000,000.00. At about the time the parties 
separated, defendant closed all the corporate 
accounts and thereafter ceased all record 
keeping. Defendant testified that although 
Diana, Inc. was once a profitable business, at 
the time of trial, it had a net worth of nega-
tive $50,400.00.Plaintiff, unable to show 
For complete Utah Code Annotations, 
current value due to defendant's failure to 
keep records, did present some evidence of 
defendant's mismanagement and large expe-
nditures of corporate funds. In its findings, 
the trial court expressed concern that defen-
dant had failed to fully disclose the 
company's true value. 
Assets are usually valued at the time of the 
divorce decree. Berger v. Berger, 713 P.2d 
695, 697 (Utah 1985); Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 
P.2d 1218, 1223 (Utah 1980). However, where 
one party has dissipated an asset, hidden its 
value, or otherwise acted obstructively, the 
trial court may, under its broad discretion, 
value the property at an earlier date, i.e., 
separation. In re Marriage of Priddis, 132 Cal. 
App. 3d 349, 183 Cal. Rptr. 37, 39 (1982); In 
re Marriage of Stallcup, 97 Cal. App. 3d 294, 
158 Cal. Rptr. 679, 682 (1979). In view of the 
evidence adduced at trial, the trial court might 
therefore value Diana, Inc. as of the time the 
parties separated in November, 1983. 
Remanded. No costs awarded. 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
1. Defendant blamed the drastic reduction of value 
on recent repossessions and theft of most of his 
company vehicles and equipment, resulting in the 
loss of all major contracts. • • - -
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BENCH, Judge: 
- 'Defendant appeals the property division, 
alimony award, and attorney fees award in a 
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decree of divorce. We affirm the property 
division and the award of alimony, but we 
reverse the award of attorney fees. 
Plaintiff Donna S. Talley and defendant 
Glenn E. Talley were married on June 14, 
1968. On December 14, 1983, plaintiff filed a 
complaint for divorce. 
At trial on August 27, 1984, the court rec-
eived evidence in the form of testimony and 
exhibits regarding the value of the marital 
assets, alimony, and attorney fees. The court 
issued a memorandum of decision on Septe-
mber 4, 1984. In its decision the court assi-
gned values and distributed the marital prop-
erty by awarding plaintiff, among other items, 
the parties' home, her personal property, and 
a portion of the furniture and fixtures in the 
home. The court awarded defendant, among 
other items, a boat, various stock, his retire-
ment plan, his personal property, and a 
portion of the furniture and fixtures in the 
home. The court also awarded alimony and 
attorney fees to plaintiff. The court filed its 
formal findings, conclusions and decree on 
November 14,1984. 
On appeal, defendant contends the trial 
court erred in disproportionately assigning 
values to marital assets with insufficient evi-
dence. 
Determining and assigning values to marital 
property is a matter for the trial court, and 
this Court will not disturb those determinat-
ions absent a showing of clear abuse of disc-
retion. Yelderman v. Yelderman, 669 P.2d 406 
(Utah 1983); Turner v. Turner, 649 P.2d 6 
(Utah 1982). While defendant has concededly 
shown that the trial court valued certain items 
of marital property either contrary to or in the 
absence of his testimony, he has failed to 
show how this constitutes an abuse of discre-
tion. We therefore affirm the disposition of 
the marital property. , 
Defendant next argues the trial court erred 
in awarding alimony to plaintiff. Defendant 
argues the testimony and evidence at trial 
failed to demonstrate plaintiffs actual need 
for alimony. 
The purpose of alimony is to "enable the 
receiving spouse to maintain as nearly as 
possible the standard of living enjoyed during 
the marriage and to prevent the spouse from 
becoming a public charge". Eames v. Eames, 
735 P.2d 395, 397 (Utah App. 1987) (citing Paf-
fel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96, 100 (Utah 
1986)). This Court will not interfere with an 
award of alimony absent a showing of-a clear 
and prejudicial abuse of discretion. Id. 
In Eames, this Court reiterated the three 
factors, previously adopted by the Utah 
Supreme Court, that the trial court must 
consider in awarding alimony: 1) the financial 
condition and needs of the receiving spouse, 2) 
the ability of the receiving spouse to produce a 
•;• sufficient income for himself or herself, and 3) 
the ability of the paying spouse to provide 
LNCE REPORTS PZ^ 
support. Id.; see also Boyle v. Boylet 735 P.2d 
669 (Utah App. 1987). 
In the instant case, the parties were married 
for fifteen years. At the time of the divorce, 
plaintiff netted approximately $953.00 per 
month from her employment, while defendant 
earned approximately $2,018.00 net per 
month. Plaintiff testified her monthly expenses 
totaled $1,320.00. She asked for $500.00 per 
month permanent alimony. The court awarded 
her $250.00 per month for the first two years 
and $150.00 per month for the following three 
years. The record is clear the court considered, 
the required factors, and we therefore affirm 
the award of alimony. 
Defendant finally argues the trial court's 
award of plaintiffs attorney fees was in error 
as the court failed to address the reasonable-
ness of the fees requested by plaintiffs 
counsel. 
"In divorce cases, an award of attorney fees 
must be supported by evidence that it is reas-
onable in amount and reasonably needed by 
the party requesting the award." Huck v. 
Huck, 734 P.2d 417, 419 (Utah 1986). Alth-
ough plaintiff sufficiently demonstrated reas-
onable financial need, she failed to present 
evidence of the reasonableness of the fee req-
uested. At the close of plaintiffs case, her 
counsel proffered testimony and produced an 
exhibit itemizing the time and costs expended 
by him, his associate, and his clerk, and the 
hourly rates charged for each. Conspicuously 
absent is any evidence "regarding the necessity 
of the number of hours dedicated, the reaso-
nableness of the rate charged in light of the 
difficulty of the case and the result accompli-
shed, and the rates commonly charged for 
divorce actions in the community ...." Kerr v. 
Kerr, 610P.2d 1380, 1384-85 (Utah 1980). 
Because plaintiff failed in her burden of 
establishing the reasonableness of the attorney 
fees requested, we reverse the award of atto-
rney fees. Beals v. Beals, 682 P.2d 862 (Utah 
1984); Delatore v. Delatore, 680 P.2d 27 (Utah 
1984). 
Affirmed in part, reversed irr part. Parties 
to bear their own costs. 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
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OPINION 
BILLINGS, Judge: 
The wife appeals from the property distri-
bution and alimony provisions of the decree of 
divorce. She contends the trial court abused its 
discretion by not awarding her an equitable 
share of the marital assets, and in fixing 
alimony at $1.00 per year. We agree, and, 
therefore, reverse and remand. 
I. 
FACTS 
Debbie Lee ("the wife") and Dennis Lee 
("the husband") were married for almost nine 
years, from December 9, 1976 until July 25. 
1985. At the time of the marriage, the wife 
was employed, primarily performing clerical 
functions. Shortly after the marriage, the wife 
quit her job at her husband's request. The 
wife's premarital property was minimal. At 
the time of the marriage, the husband was the 
General Mine Foreman of Valley Camp 
Company/Prior to the marriage, the husband 
and his brother established a garbage collec-
tion business, in which the husband made a 
substantial monetary investment from personal 
assets. Subsequent to the parties' marriage, 
the husband and his brother sold the garbage 
business and established D & D Equipment 
and Supply ("D & D"), a corporation involved 
in the coal industry. The husband owned 52 
percent of the shares of D & D. The 
husband's premarital assets consisted of a D8 
cat (tractor), a 1973 Buick automobile, a 1972 
pickup truck, and an $18,000 certificate of 
deposit. 
During the marriage the parties had two 
children, purchased a mobile home and other 
minor assets, and continued the operation of 
D & D, the primary income-producing asset 
of the marriage. The husband worked for D & 
D for the duration of the marriage. The wife 
performed clerical duties for D & D during the 
marriage, including paying monthly bills, 
answering phones, and typing. The wife was 
not compensated for her services for over 
three years.1 
At trial, the valuation of D & D and its 
distribution as a marital asset were the main 
issues. A financial statement, dated February 
I, 1985, signed by the husband, and submitted 
by him to Zions First National Bank, was 
admitted into evidence. This statement listed 
the total assets of D & D as $521,389, the 
total iiabiiites as $65,966, for a net worth of 
$455,423. The wife also testified that as of the 
Wednesday before the trial commenced, the 
balance in D & D's checking account was 
$57,846. The husband called Marvin Mutz, a 
bookkeeper who prepared the year-end tax 
reports of D & D, to testify on the value of 
the company. A financial statement prepared 
by Mutz showed the total net worth of D & D 
as $112,397.34. The husband testified that the 
real property of the business had a value of 
$40,000, making the total net worth of D & D 
assets, according to the husband, $152,397.34. 
Mutz also estimated the value of the 
husband's 52 percent ownership of D & D 
stock to be $33,528. Mutz's estimation of the 
value of the husband's 52 percent interest in 
D & D was based upon the husband's perce-
ntage of total authorized shares (100,000), and 
not upon total issued shares (40,000). If the 
value of the husband's 52 percent interest in 
D & D had been based upon issued shares, the 
value of his stock, according to his own 
expert's testimony, would be $83,820,00.2 
At the time of trial, the wife, had a high 
school education, and was currently unempl-
oyed despite her efforts at seeking employ-
ment. 
The trial court awarded the wife assets 
valued at $19,000. The court awarded the 52 
percent interest in D & D exclusively to the 
husband, without assigning any value to the 
company, together with other assets valued at 
$3,500. The wife was awarded $1.00 per year 
in alimony. 
Two issues are raised on appeal. First, did 
the trial court deny the wife her equitable 
share of marital assets by refusing to place a 
value on D & D to allow a cash distribution to 
the wife, or, if it was unable to assign a value, 
by failing to make an in-kind distribution of 
the stock to her? Second, did the trial court 
abuse its discretion in fixing the alimony 
award at $ 1.00 per year? 
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In divorce proceedings, the trial court has 
considerable discretion in adjusting the fina-
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ncial and property interests of the parties. 
Argyle v. Argyle, 68$ P.2d 468, 470 (Utah 
1984). The "determination of the value of the 
assets is a matter for the trial court which will 
not be reviewed in the absence of a clear abuse 
of discretion." Turner v. Turner, 649 P.2d 6, 
8 (Utah 1982) (citations omitted). However, 
the trial court must make findings on ail 
material issues, and its failure to do so cons-
titutes reversible error unless the facts in the 
record are "clear, uncontroverted, and capable 
of supporting only a finding in favor of the 
judgment." Acton v. Deliran, 131 P.2d 996, 
999 (Utah 1987). The findings must be suffi-
ciently detailed and consist of enough subsid-
iary facts to reveal the steps the court took to j 
reach its conclusion on each factual issue ! 
presented. Id. ! 
rii. j 
DISTRIBUTION OF MARITAL ASSETS 
The wife contends the trial court erred in j 
refusing to assign a value to the husband's 52 j 
percent in D & D, a marital asset, and in 
awarding it exclusively to the husband. We 
agree. The lower court, in its findings, states | 
that "[b]ased on the evidence presented to the 
court at trial the court refuse[s] to place a 
value on the parties['] share of the corpora- ! 
tion .... [T]he market value of business cannot j 
be determined from the evidence presented." j 
A wife is entitled to a fair and equitable \ 
share of the financial benefits accumulated by 
virtue of the parties' joint efforts during the 
marriage. See Savage v. Savage, 658 P.2d j 
1201, 1204 (Utah 1983). D & D was establi-
shed after the parties' marriage, and its value i 
was actualized during the marriage. 
The wife assisted in the operation of the 
corporation by assuming clerical duties, incl-
uding typing, answering the phones, and 
paying bills. Moreover, the wife* also reared 
the parties' two children and performed 
domestic duties, allowing the husband to 
participate full-time in the business. There-
fore, she is entitled to a fair and equitable 
share of D & D. The trial court's award of 
the 52 percent interest in D & D, the principal 
asset of the marriage, exclusively to the 
husband without any findings as to its value 
constitutes a clear abuse of discretion. i 
Alternative avenues were available to the 
trial court to award the wife her equitable i 
share of D & D. First, the trial court could 
have valued the husband's 52 percent interest 
in D & D based on the financial statements 
and testimony submitted by the parties. The 
court could then have awarded the wife an 
equitable portion of D & D by way of off-
setting property, or a cash distribution payable 
over a period of time. This alternative was 
sanctioned by the Utah Supreme Court in 
Argyle v. Argyle, 688 P.2d 468 (Utah 1984). 
In Argyle, the trial court awarded the wife one-
half of the husband's interest in a closely held 
family ranch. The trial court relied on recent 
financial statements prepared by the corpora-
tion for the Production Credit Administration 
to determine the value of the corporation. 
After deducting from that amount the value of 
a gift the husband received from his mother, 
the court halved the balance to determine the 
husband's interest and halved the figure again 
to reach the wife's marital cash share of the 
property. This approach was affirmed by the 
Utah Supreme Court, where it found that the 
value of stock can be measured by the net 
worth of the underlying assets. Id.; see 
Johnson v. Johnson, 674 P.2d 539, 544 (Okla. 
1983) (value of stock could be computed based 
upon a financial statement). 
Both parties introduced financial statements 
reflecting the total net worth of D & D's 
assets. The wife submitted a financial statment 
dated February 1, 1985, prepared for Zions 
First National Bank. This statement showed 
the net worth of D & D assets as $455,423. 
The husband also submitted a financial state-
ment through . Marvin Mutz, a bookkeeper 
who prepared D & D's year-end tax reports. 
This statement showed the total net worth of 
D & D as $112,397.34. The husband then 
testified that the value of the real property of 
D & D was $40,000, making the total net 
worth of D & D, according to the husband, 
$152,397.34. Further, Marvin Mutz testified 
that the value of the husband's 52 percent 
interest in D & D stock was $33,528. In 
making this estimation, if Mutz had used the 
number of total issued shares (40,000), rather 
than total authorized shares (100,000), to 
calculate the value per share, the husband's 52 
percent interest in D & D would be valued at 
$83,820.00. 
Applying Argyle, the trial court could have 
assigned a value to D & D. The trial court 
could then have determined 52 percent of the 
company as representing the husband's inte-
rest, subtracted any premarital contribution by 
the husband, and halved the remainder to 
reach the wife's marital cash share of the 
corporation. 
If the trial court, because of the great dis-
parity of testimony, was unable to assign a 
value to D & D, then the court could have 
made an in-kind distribution of D & D stock 
to the wife. This alternative was affirmed by 
the Utah Supreme Court in Savage v. Savage, 
658 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1983).3 The supreme 
court, while acknowledging that whenever 
possible continued joint ownership by divorced 
spouses of closely held corporate stock should 
be avoided, agreed that the trial court had 
"virtually no alternative to an in-kind distr-', 
ibution of Savage stock" because of the widely 
conflicting valuations. Savage, 658 P.2d at 
1204. 
In the case at hand, the trial court decided 
not to award the wife a percentage of the 
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stock held by the husband because "D & D is 
controlled by the husband, and the possibility 
of ever receiving a dividend or establishing a 
market value for the stock would be extremely 
remote." While this observation may be true, 
we find that to award' the wife nothing is 
patently unjust. 
Due to the trial court's failure to value D & 
D stock or to award the wife her equitable 
share of the stock in D & D, a marital asset, 
we reverse and remand this case to the district 
court for further proceedings. On remand, the 
district court shall award the wife her equit-
able share of the corporation, whether it be a 
cash settlement or an in-kind distribution, set 
forth findings to support its decision, and 
enter judgment accordingly. 
IV. 
/"* "• ' - ALIMONY 
/ The wife's second objection to the decree of 
/divorce is that the trial court abused its disc-
re t ion in determining the amount of alimony 
/ by failing to adequately consider the factors 
/ set forth in Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 
/ 1079 (Utah 1985). We agree. 
J The propose of anmony is to "PTONI&S 
' support for the wife as nearly as possible at 
/ the standard of living she enjoyed during 
/ marriage, and to prevent the wife from beco-
| ming a public charge." English v. English, 565 
j P.2d 409, 411 (Utah 1977). In fixing alimony 
I awards, three factors must be considered: (1) 
» the financial conditions and needs of the 
l spouse; (2) the ability of the spouse to produce 
{ sufficient income for herself; and, (3) the 
j ability of the paying spouse to provide 
! support. Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1079 
j (Utah 1985) (citations omitted). After a careful 
j review of the record, we find no support or 
explanation for the $1.00 per year alimony 
I award. 
The wife is currently unemployed. She was 
fired from her job at D & D. She has not 
j found employment despite her persistent 
t efforts. The wife was awarded no income-
i producing assets or cash. She now must incur 
the expense of moving the mobile home curr-
ently situated on the husband's mother's 
I property, in addition to incurring her ordinary 
I Vrvmg expenses. 
The wife was married at the age of 20 with 
j a high school education and clerical skills. She 
1 terminated her former employment at her 
I husband's request. During the marriage, the 
wife devoted her time to raising the couple's 
\ two children and working for D & D. 
1 At trial the husband testifed that he had 
1 made $1,800 per month for the'four, years 
I preceding the divorce. Moreover, the husband 
•A -was awarded D & D, an lncomerproducing 
V asset. However, the record indicates that the 
\ income generated by D & D had been decii-
Y ning, given the depressed conditions of the 
coal market. 
The trial court made no findings of fact to 
support its award of $1.00 per year alimony as 
required by Acton y. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 
999 (Utah 1987). Therefore, we reverse and 
remand for the trial court to fix the alimony 
award in light of the three factors articulated 
in Jones, in addition to distributing to the wife 
her equitable share of the marital assets. 
Reversed and remanded. Costs awarded to 
appellant. 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
1. In a temporary order, entered .July 30, 1984, the 
trial court, in ruling on temporary alimony, ordered 
the husband to maintain the wife as an employee of 
D & D, rather than have the husband pay the wife 
temporary alimony. 
2. Computed as follows: 
$152,397.34 divided by 40,000 shares = $3.81 per 
share 
The husband has 22000 shares at $3.81 per share 
= $83,820. 
3. A.s Jvisxice Stewart sX&tss v\ his, opposiucm to aa 
in-kind distribution of stock in divorce actions: "a 
better approach than the distribution in kind ... 
would be to remand [the] case for a determination 
by the trial judge of the actual value of the corpor-
ation!.]" He believes *[t]hat task is no different, or 
more difficult, than the same task which must be 
performed in most tort cases, contract cases, and 
property cases where an award of damages is 
made." Savage v. Savage, 658 P.2d 1201, 1206 
(Stewart, J. dissenting). 
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was not subject to exact determination, as was 
demonstrated by three experts who disagreed 
as to its size. Therefore, the judge erred in 
judicially noticing the size of the property and 
failing.to submit that issue to the jury. . 
However, we must also consider whether or 
not the error was prejudicial. An "error or 
defect in any ruling or order or in anything 
done or omitted by the court7' shall be disre-
garded unless it affects the substantial rights ' 
of the parties. Utah R. Civ. P. 61. Such error 
is harmless unless it probably would have had 
a "substantial influence in bringing about a 
different verdict." Redevelopment Agency v. 
Tanner, 740 P.2d 1296, 1303-04 (Utah 1987); 
Hill v. Hartog, 658 P.2d 1206, 1208 (Utah 
1983); Gillmor v. Gillmor, 657 P.2d 736, 743 
(Utah 1982). In reviewing such an error, the 
evidence is viewed in the light most favorable 
to the jury verdict. Hill, 658 P.2d at 1209. 
In the case before this court one expert 
testified that the property was 33,129 square I 
feet, another that it was between 33,000 and ; 
34,000 square feet and a third that it was I 
31,423 square feet. The judge's estimate that 
the property was close to 32,000 square feet 
falls within the experts' estimates. Therefore, I 
the jury's award could have been based on the I 
experts' testimony as easily as that of the I 
judge. Viewing the evidence in the light most j 
favorable to the verdict, we find the judge's 
error in judicially noticing the size of the 
property rather than submitting the issue to 
the jury to be harmless error, as the evidence 
properly admitted at trial independently sup-
ports the jury verdict. 
III . I 
Defendant's third claim on appeal is that I 
the trial court erred in refusing to allow 
moving costs for defendant's business and 
f a m i l y . / U t a h Code A n n , §11-19-
23.9(2)(1986) provides that a jury may award a 
reasonable sum as compensation for the costs 
and expenses of relocating the owner whose 
property is acquired or a party conducting a 
business on the property. Since the statute is 
permissive, it is within the discretion of the 
jury to determine allowable compensation. We 
find the jury's award of $18,300 to be reaso-
nable and affirm that award. 
• • ••-: . ' • , • ' • , • - . - - . • ^ • v ; ; : - I V ; ' - / : , • • ; • ' - ? ; - ; ^ : , : , - Y : 
Defendant's final claim is that under Utah 
Code Ann. §11-19-23.9 (1986) she is ent-
itled to attorney fees. Section 11-19-23.9 
states that a court may award attorney fees if 
the jury or trier of fact awards more to a 
property owner than the original offer of the 
condemning agency. Defendant claims that if 
the 'award of $128,000 is calculated on a 
square footage basis, it is greater than" the 
condemning"agency's offerqf$150,000. j 
We -find appellant's c^ 
First, the^ statute is permissive. Second, >the 
award is not higher than the total amount 
actually awarded. We therefore reject defen-
dant's claim for attorney fees. 
Affirmed. 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Regnal W. Garff, Judge 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
1. Keith S. Jones did not join in this appeal and did 
not request moving expenses at trial. 
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OPINION 
JACKSON, Judge: 
The parties herein were both granted a 
divorce in a June 28, 1983 decree that distri-
buted only a few items of personal property. 
All other issues were taken under advisement. 
The proceedings were finalized by an amended 
judgment entered February 14, 1984. The 
assets of the parties were divided almost 
equally. Mr. Canning was ordered to pay 
about $6,000.00 of personal and joint obliga-
tions and $350.00 monthly for support of two 
minor sons (issue of a prior marriage of the 
parties). Alimony was denied. On appeal, Mrs. 
Canning challenges the distribution of prop-
erty, the amount of child support, and the 
denial of alimony. We affirm the distribution 
of assets and obligations and the child support 
award. We reverse the amended judgment on 
the issue of alimony and remand for additi-
onal findings and possible modification.. 
A I J ^ N Y 
: 0 n this -case,; the denial of alimony was a 
dear abuse of discretion because the record 
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does not reveal that the court considered or 
made any finding of Mrs. Canning's current 
or future ability to work. Higley v. Higley, 
676 P.2d 379 (Utah 1983). Higley was decided 
on December 19, 1983, while the Canning 
findings were being finalized; its ramifications 
were not addressed in the briefs of either party 
to this appeal. Here, the trial court found only 
that "Plaintiff [David Canning] had bi-
weekly gross income of $1,019.00, and Defe-
ndant [Caleen Canning] was unemployed" at 
the time of trial (Finding of Fact No. 3) and 
that "Defendant should be awarded no 
alimony" (Finding of Fact No. 7). 
The purpose and objective of alimony have 
been described in a framework of several 
decisions. The cornerstone is language in 
English v. English, 565 P.2d 409 (Utah 1977), 
adopted from another jurisdiction: 
The standard utilized by the trial 
court, viz., the length of the marr-
iage and the contributions of each 
to their joint financial success, is 
•not an appropriate measure to det-
ermine alimony. There is a distinc-
tion between the division of assets 
accumulated during marriage, which 
should be distributed upon an 
equitable basis, and the post- . 
marital duty of support and main-
tenance. 
The purpose of alimony is to 
provide support for the wife and 
not to inflict punitive damages on 
the husband. Alimony is not inte-
nded as a penalty against the 
husband nor a reward to the wife 
In Nace v. Nace, [107 Ariz. 411, 
489 P.2d 48, 50 (1971),] the court 
stated that the most important 
function of alimony is to provide 
support for the wife as nearly as 
possible at the standard of living 
she enjoyed during marriage, and to 
prevent the wife from becoming a 
public charge. The court observed 
that criteria considered in determi-
ning a reasonable award for support 
and maintenance include the fina-
ncial conditions and needs of. the 
wife, the ability of the wife to 
produce a sufficient income for 
herself; [sic] and the ability of the 
husband to provide support. 
Id. at 411-12 (citations omitted). See Jones v. 
Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985); Jepp-
son v. Jeppson, 684 P.2d 69, 70 (Utah 
1984).1 Failure to consider the three factors 
enunciated in English constitutes an abuse of 
the lower court's discretion. Paffel v. Paffel, 
732P.2d96,101 (Utahl986),; 
Mr. Canning earned almost $28,000 annu-
ally as a Mountain Bell repairman during each 
of the two calendar years prior to the divorce. 
He had seventeen years of tenure with his 
company. Mrs. Canning had earned about 
$1,200 during the prior year. She had only a 
high school education and insignificant job 
skills to market. Her off-and-on work was 
always in the minimum wage category. Her 
ability to work was impaired by an ulcer and 
by the disabilities of their minor sons. Both 
were handicapped by learning dysfunctions; 
one was being treated by a psychologist for 
emotional problems. She was seeking a flexible 
work schedule so she could devote necessary 
time to their special needs. It is doubtful that 
she could find and keep a full-time job. Even 
if able to do so, her earnings would be 
minimal for an extended period. 
Mr. Canning claimed necessary monthly 
living expenses amounting to $350 more than 
Mrs. Canning claimed for herself and the two 
sons. We note that he was paying an identical 
amount, i.e. $350, as child support under a 
temporary order, later made permanent by the 
decree. Mr. - Canning's annual gross income 
will be about $24,000 after deducting child 
support (assuming no increase in salary). The 
disparity between his annual income of 
$24,000 and her $1,200 plus $4,200 child 
support is striking, even though he was 
ordered to pay $3,306 of marital debts and 
$3,212 of debts incurred by him after the 
parties separated. 
The denial of alimony to Caleen Canning 
creates a great disparity in future annual 
incomes and the parties' respective standards 
of living, a situation remarkably similar to 
that created by the lower court's meager 
alimony award in Higley. David Canning's 
standard of living will be much closer to what 
it was during the marriage than will appel-
lant's. When the above considerations are 
coupled with the absence of any finding about 
Mrs. Canning's ability to work or her earning 
capacity, the trial court's failure to award 
alimony is a clear and prejudicial abuse of 
discretion. Although this Court has the power 
to modify the decree accordingly, the lack of 
necessary findings in the record prevents us 
from doing so. Higley v. Higley, 676 P.2d at 
382. . ; : ,;,,f[.^s 
The decree appears to contemplate that 
appellant would obtain work and earn income 
sufficient to support herself and the parties' 
children. Without specific factual findings to 
that effect, she is left without a baseline for 
future modification purposes if she does not in I 
fact obtain ongoing, income-producing work. 
See id. at 382 & n. 1. On the other hand, if 
she does obtain any such work (as long as the 
baseline is the present zero), that income will 
reflect improved ^circumstances to her" detri-
ment.^  She should notf be thus" pe^ 
Vleast until she exceeds the baseline amount 
which the decree contemplates she will earn, 
an amount which would have to be sufficient 
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to provide the necessities of life. 
PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION 
The trial court and counsel were perplexed 
about the effect of the first (almost seventeen 
year) marriage and divorce of the parties upon 
their second (twenty month) marriage and 
divorce. The proceedings became bifurcated to 
determine how the on-again off-again rel-
ationship of the parties should influence the 
distribution of property and the provisions for 
support and maintenance. 
During this interim in the decision-making 
process, counsel submitted simultaneous 
memoranda to the court. Respondent's 
memorandum was submitted "in support of 
his position that for purposes of determining 
alimony and allocating [respondent]'s pension 
and stock benefits only the period of the 
parties' remarriage should be considered." 
Appellant's memorandum was submitted 
" regarding the effect of a re-marriage on the 
parties' rights and the [appellant]'s claim 
upon the plaintiff's retirement benefits/ 
Respondent summarized that "only the period 
of the parties' second marriage (twenty 
months) should be considered for purposes of 
determining alimony or allocation of emplo-
yment benefits/ Appellant concluded that 
"this Court should consider the marriage rel-
ationship of these parties in toto and make a 
fair award of support and alimony and a 
division of all assets based upon a marriage of 
eighteen and a half years during which the 
parties acquired as substantial assets both a 
home and retirement benefits." The court 
thereafter recorded its oral ruling on a minute 
entry form with a handwritten sheet attached. 
The sheet contains the following paragraph: 
Court finds the marriage to be 
considered in this action is only the 
marriage of January 1981. The 
pension and stock benefit rights 
come into the marriage as the sole 
property and rights of Mr. 
Canning. Wife has retained all she 
brought into the marriage. Value of 
pension/retirement fund Court 
finds is $2,542.00 as of date of 
trial. 
Four months later, the following typed minute 
entry was entered: 
Memorandum ruling on divorce 
matters not previously ruled upon. 
In this case divorce has been 
granted and several other matters 
decided and ruled upon. As to the 
remaining matters for ruling: 
1. Oral ruling as to pension is not 
binding upon the court and the 
court awards defendant 1/2 of the 
cash value of the pension plan; 1/2 
of the cash value being $1271.00, 
total cash value found to be $2542. 
2. Defendant having custody of the 
minor children, Plaintiff is to pay 
as support the sum of $175.00 per 
month per child. Defendant may 
claim youngest child as dependent 
for tax purposes. Plaintiff may 
claim older child. Child support to 
be paid 1/2 by 5th day of each 
month and 1/2 by 20th day [sic] 
month. 
3. Plaintiff to pay marital debts and 
obligations outstanding and his own 
debts and obligations and hold her 
harmless. 
4. Life insurance on plaintiff to be 
in force and effect with children as 
beneficiaries until children attain 
their majority. Amount of insur-
ance to be kept in effect need not 
exceed $15,000 each child. (Court is . 
aware that in event of death of 
father certain social security bene-
fits would be available to children.) 
5. Plaintiff to maintain health, 
dental, optical insurance as avail-
able through his employer, for 
children, and he is to pay 1/2 of 
costs that exceed the insurance 
benefits payable; cosmetic dental, 
etc., is not to be paid by either 
party unless they agree to share 
such cost. 
6. The 1982 income tax refunds 
should be divided 50/50. 
7. Balance of proceeds from sale of 
house to be divided equally. Note: 
marital obligations are to be paid 
by Mr. Canning, plaintiff, and he is 
to pay Credit Union and J. C. 
Penney bills he incurred. 
8. Plaintiff awarded the stock share 
plan benefits. 
9. Decree has been entered previo-
usly, awarding divorce. 
10. Matter of child custody, visita-
tion, previously ruled upon. 
11. Distribution of personal prop-
erty has previously been ruled upon. 
12. Attorney's fees have been ruled 
upon. 
The underlying premise of Mrs. Canning's 
appeal is that in "the final decree ... the Court 
considered only the second (21 month) marr-
iage of the parties and did not consider the 
first (16+ year) marriage of the parties." We 
have searched both the decree of divorce and 
amended judgment in vain. Neither of those 
documents nor the final findings upon which 
they are based contain any such language or 
compel any such inference. ' -h-;•'• 
The subsequent action taken and final dis-
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position made by the court also do not dem-
onstrate that the court operated in a rigid 
compartment of time. Otherwise, there would 
not have been an award of child support since 
the minor sons were not issue of the marriage 
being dissolved. Furthermore, if the trial judge 
was only taking into account the parties* 
second, brief marriage, Mrs. Canning would 
not have been awarded 1/2 of the pension 
fund that had accrued primarily during their 
first marriage. 
We recognize that a district judge faces a 
difficult task in almost every divorce action. 
"The court's responsibility is to endeavor to 
provide a just and equitable adjustment of 
their economic resources so that the parties 
can reconstruct their lives on a happy and 
useful basis/ Wilson v. Wilson, 5 Utah 2d 79, 
83, 296 P.2d 977, 979 (1956). In the more 
recent case of Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 
1218, 1222 (Utah 1980), the Utah Supreme 
Court stated: 
There is no fixed formula upon 
which to determine a division of 
properties, [sic] it is a prerogative 
of the court to make whatever dis-
position of property as it deems 
fair, equitable, and necessary for 
the protection and welfare of the 
parties. In the division of marital 
property, the trial judge has wide 
discretion, and his*findings will not 
be disturbed unless the record ind-' 
icates an abuse thereof. 
The allocations of the Cannings' assets and 
liabilities by the trial court reveal a determined 
effort to place the parties in comparable eco-
nomic positions. We cannot fault that effort 
and outcome, except as indicated above in our 
disposition of the alimony issue. Wrhile equa-
lity is a worthy goal, precise mathematical 
equality is not essential or required. See, for 
example, Berger v. Berger, 713 P.2d 695 (Utah 
1985). where sixty percent of the value of the 
assets was awarded to the wife, and Turner v. 
Turner, 649 P.2d 6 (Utah 1982), where the 
wife received twenty-seven percent of the 
assets (her calculation) or forty-two percent 
(his calculation). 
Mrs. Canning argues that the home became 
her sole and separate property after the 
parties' first divorce and remained so after 
they remarried. Although the house (acquired 
during the first marriage) was awarded to Mrs. 
Canning in the first divorce, it was subject to 
a $15,000 lien in favor of Mr. Canning and to 
a first mortgage. After remarriage, the parties 
jointly borrowed additional funds against the 
home which were used for their personal and 
mutual benefit, including improvements on the 
home and purchase of personal property 
which was later awarded to her. 
In any event, the parties stipulated to a sale 
of the home during the pendency of this 
divorce action. Three months before trial, they 
closed a sale and partially distributed the 
proceeds-over $11,000 to him and over 
$11,000 to her. Then they filed a stipulation 
and agreement with the court which recited 
that they had sold the home and had "in part 
distributed the proceeds/ They agreed that 
additional proceeds from the sale be held until 
further order of the trial court. The court 
subsequently distributed the remaining funds 
in accordance with its memorandum ruling 
recited above. In view of all the circumstances 
described, we cannot say that the district court 
abused its discretion concerning the home sale 
proceeds. "A trial court's apportionment of 
marital property will not be disturbed unless it 
works such a manifest injustice or inequity as 
to indicate a clear abuse of discretion." Turner 
v. Turner, 649 P.2d at 8. 
Mrs. Canning next contends that she did not 
receive an equitable share of Mr. Canning's 
retirement benefits. She does not challenge the 
50/50 splil; she contends that the trial court 
erred in accepting the value calculated by 
respondent's expert instead of the higher value 
calculated by her expert. However, "it is 
within the province of the fact findeT to 
believe those witnesses or evidence it chooses/ 
Yelderman v; Yelderman, 669 P.2d 406, 408 
(Utah 1983). The value of the retirement 
benefits as found by the trial court is substa-
ntiated by the record, and we will not disturb 
it on appeal. Id. See Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). 
Appellant tried her case on the basis that the 
value of the retirement benefits could be asc-
ertained. She never suggested to the trial court 
that they were incapable of valuation at the 
time of trial, thereby requiring use of the 
deferred distribution method enunciated in 
Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 
1982). Although she may now prefer the Wood-
ward approach, we will not address this 
issue for the first- time on appeal. See Utility 
Trailer Sales, Inc. v. Fake, 62 Utah Adv. Rep. 
7, 8 (1987); Insley Mfg. Corp. v. Draper Bank 
& Trust, 111 P.2d 1341,1347 (Utah 1986). 
CHILD SUPPORT 
Appellant's final challenge on appeal is to 
the level of child support awarded. In her 
complaint, Mrs. Canning sought $200 per 
month per child, for a total monthly request 
of $400. The court considered the needs of the 
children, as well as the relative abilities of the 
parties to meet them, and ordered Mr. 
Canning to pay $175 per month per child, for 
a total monthly award of $350. The monthly 
$50 difference between what she requested and 
what she received can hardly be characterized 
as an abuse of discretion. We will not second-
guess the award. See Jorgenson v. Jorgenson, 
667 P.2d 22,23 (Utah 1983). 
The judgment of the court below is affirmed 
as to property distribution and child support. 
That portion of the judgment awarding no 
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aiimony to appellant is reversed, and the 
matter is remanded to the trial court for 
additional findings of fact and possible mod-
ification of the judgment. Costs to appellant. 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
1. For more expansive lists of criteria see MacDo-
nald v. MacDonald, 120 Utah 573, 236 P.2d 1066, 
1C70 (1951) and Wilson v. Wilson, 5 Utah 2d 79, 
296 P.2d 977, 979-80 (1956). 
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OPINION 
JACKSON, Judge: 
Champlin Petroleum Company has petiti-
oned this Court for a writ of review challen-
ging a decision of the Industrial Commission's 
Board of Review. The Board affirmed an 
administrative law judge's holding that 
Michael D. Robinson was entitled to unemp-
loyment benefits because he was not discha-
rged from his employment for just cause 
under the Employment Security Act, Utah 
Code Ann. §35-4-5(b)(l) (1987). Champlin 
was, accordingly, held liable for the benefit 
charges in connection with Robinson's claim. 
We affirm the Board of Review's decision. 
•The following basic facts are not disputed 
by the parties: 
C h a m p l i n P e t r o l e u m C o m p a n y 
("Champlin") took over operation of the Pine 
View natural gas processing plant in Summit 
County, Utah, from American Quasar in April 
of 1985. Robinson, a gas plant operator for 
American Quasar, was retained in that posi-
tion by Champh'n. As such, he primarily 
worked alone in a job that had the potential 
for emergency, life-threatening situations 
requiring fast and efficient handling to avoid 
injury to persons or property. Charnplin's 
schedule required him to work erratic hours-
seven evening shifts before two days off, then 
six daylight shifts and two days off, followed 
by seven morning shifts and four days off. 
Robinson's work performance was never cri-
ticized as inadequate or improper by either 
employer. 
Robinson had a history of mental disturb-
ances of varying degrees of severity dating 
back to 1975. In 1982, Robinson was diagn-
osed as suffering from paranoid schizophr-
enia, a condition for which he was treated 
with medication. Records of his treatment for 
these disturbances were in his file at Cham-
plin. At the hearing before the administrative 
law judge, he described the 1982 episode as an 
emotional or nervous breakdown. 
Robinson suffered a similar breakdown 
episode on April 30, 1986, which required 
immediate hospitalization that lasted until 
May 12. During this time, Champlin paid 
Robinson accumulated sick leave benefits. Dr. 
Davidson, Robinson's treating physician, 
wrote "Mike is able to return to work" on a 
prescription form dated May 19. On May 21, 
Robinson's supervisor received a copy of a 
May 19 hospital disoharge report in which 
Davidson diagnosed symptoms of paranoia 
attributed to intermittent use of and withdr-
awal from marijuana about a month earlier, 
coupled with an underlying manic depressive 
disease. Davidson prescribed Lithium and 
Haldol as treatment for the mental illness and 
suggested that, before Robinson returned to 
his job, he should be "given an opportunity to 
work in an environment where his job perfo-
rmance [could] be evaluated by someone else." 
Champlin, upon receipt of the discharge 
report, immediately notified Robinson that he 
might be suspended. On May 28, he received a 
termination letter that referred to Davidson's 
note and report and then stated, "Since you 
are unable to return to work, without limita-
tion, we regretfully must terminate your 
employment as of the end of your paid sick 
leave, May 24, 1986." 
Our review of the application of the law to 
the pertinent facts in this case falls under the 
"intermediate" standard of review, under, 
which we must determine whether it is within 
the limits of reasonableness and rationality. 
Young v. Board of Review, 731 P.2d 480, 482 
(Utah 1986); Board of Educ. of Sevier County 
v. Board of Review, 701 P.2d 1064, 1067 
(Utah 1985); Kehl v. Board of Review, 700 
P.2d 1129, 1133 (Utah 1985); City of Orem v. 
Christensen, 682 P.2d 292, 293 (Utah 1984). See 
Utah Dept. of Admin. Servs. v. Public 
Serv. Comm'n, 658 P.2d 601, 610 (Utah 
1983). We must affirm the Board's determi-
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§30-3-5. U.C.A. 
Disposition of property - Maintenance and healthcare of 
parties and children - Court to have continuing 
jurisdiction - Custody and visitation - Termination of 
alimony - Nonmeritorious petition for modification. 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may 
include in it equitable orders relating to the children, 
property, and parties. The Court shall include the following in 
every decree of divorce: 
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment 
of reasonable and necessary medical and dental expenses of 
the dependent children; and 
(b) if coverage is available at a reasonable cost, an 
order requiring the purchase and maintenance of appropriate 
health, hospital, and dental care insurance to the dependent 
children. 
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child 
support, an order assigning financial responsibility for all or a 
portion of child care expenses incurred on behalf of the 
dependent children, necessitated by the employment or training of 
the custodial parent. If the court determines that the 
circumstances are appropriate and that the dependent children 
would be adequately cared for, it may include an order allowing 
the non-custodial parent to provide the day care for the 
dependent children, necessitated by the employment or training of 
the custodial parent, 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make 
subsequent changes or new orders for the support and maintenance 
of the parties, the custody of the children and their support, 
maintenance, health, and dental care, or the distribution of the 
property as is reasonable and necessary. 
(4) In determing visitation rights of parents, 
grandparents, and other relatives, the court shall consider the 
welfare of the child. 
(5) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides 
otherwise, any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a 
former spouse automatically terminates upon the remarriage of 
that former spouse. However, if the remarriage is annulled and 
found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume if 
the party paying alimony is made a party to the action of 
annulment and his rights are determined. 
(6) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a 
former spouse terminates upon establishment by the party paying 
alimony that the former spouse is residing with a person of the 
opposite sex. However, if it is further established by the 
person receiving alimony that that relationship or association is 
without any sexual contact, payment of alimony shall resume. 
(7) When a petition for modification of child custody or 
visitation provisions of a court order is made and denied, the 
court may order the petitioner to pay the reasonable attorney's 
fees expended by the prevailing party in that action, if the 
court determines that the petition was without merit and not 
asserted in good faith. 
